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We have a duty to think for ourselves—to conduct our “own lives” by 
our “own lights.”1 This fairly uncontroversial premise has some troubling 
implications when it comes to law’s claim of authority over us and the 
(supposed) obligation we have to obey the law. Can law’s claim of 
authority be justified? If so, does justified legal authority entail an 
obligation to obey the law? If not, are we nonetheless justified in acting 
as if such an obligation exists? And, at least sometimes, might it be the 
case that we are duty-bound to obey law’s claim of authority over us?2 
While this Article is hardly the first to address these questions, it is the 
first to do so by combining elements of Joseph Raz’s prominent “service 
conception of authority,” along with John Gardner’s influential account 
of justification, to defend a modest version of philosophical anarchism. 
These philosophical resources illuminate new explanations regarding the 
justification of law’s claims to authority and our obedience to those 
claims.  
This Article defends the following conclusions: (1) claims of authority 
call for justification; (2) obedience to claims of authority calls for 
justification; (3) both claims of authority and obedience to authority can, 
nonetheless, be justified; and (4) despite our duty to think for ourselves, 
we may also (at least sometimes) be duty-bound to obey the law’s claim 
of authority over us.  
Primarily, this Article is an exercise in analytic legal philosophy. As 
such, its central aims are modest: to clarify the nature of authority and 
obedience and provide a framework for understanding when claims to 
authority and obedience to such claims are justified. However, this 
framework does have at least three important implications for how we 
 
 1.   JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, 57 (1986) [hereinafter RAZ, MORALITY]. I 
borrow the phrasing from Raz, but it should be noted that Raz’s substantive point does not extend to our 
having a duty in this regard. Rather, Raz’s view is that acting according to our own lights is “intrinsically 
desirable.” My thanks to Michael Seval for raising this point.   
 2.  The terms “obligation” and “duty” will be used interchangeably throughout the article. Thus, 
the phrase “having an obligation” and “being duty-bound” are equivalents. 
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engage with law in our current political climate. First, we should resist 
currently fashionable arguments grounded in the condemnation of 
“lawlessness” as such. Second, we should recognize that law, and its 
claim to authority, may be capable of (re)establishing the trust required to 
maintain our political community. Third, we should recognize and fulfill 
our obligations to law that go beyond the (supposed) obligation to obey. 
 This Article proceeds in four steps. Part I sets forth three puzzles 
concerning authority and obligation: (1) The Puzzle of Justified 
Authority; (2) The Puzzle of Entailment; (3) The Puzzle of Obedience. 
Part II unpacks a set of conceptual tools to solve these puzzles. Part III 
proposes solutions to each. Finally, Part IV explores the practical 
implications of this account on the way we should view the law’s claim 
of authority and behave toward the law in our currently fractious political 
climate. 
I. THE PUZZLES 
Sometimes people or entities issue directives that they claim are 
authoritative over others. Let us call the former group sources and the 
latter subjects. By source, I mean the person, entity, or thing that either 
issues a directive to a subject (claims authority over the subject) or is 
treated by a subject as having done so.3 The subject is either the person to 
whom the claim of authority is directed or the one who treats a source as 
having claimed authority over her.4  
In modern municipal legal systems, typical examples of sources 
include legislators voting for new laws regulating the sale of handguns or 
 
 3.  Leslie Green uses the word “superior” rather than source. LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF 
THE STATE, 42 (1990) [hereinafter GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE]. I avoid this use for fear that 
it may imply the existence of some pre-existing hierarchical relationship between the source and the 
subject – one in which the source is in a habit of issuing directives to the subject which she intends the 
subject to treat as authoritative, or the subject is in the habit of treating (at least some of) the source’s 
communications as authoritative directives – and thus may be thought to exclude the possibility of one-
off instances of authority and unintentional authority, both of which I wish to include in my account. On 
unintentional authority, see the discussion of an authoritative alarm clock in STEPHEN DARWALL, 
MORALITY, AUTHORITY AND LAW: ESSAYS IN SECOND-PERSONAL ETHICS I, 161-163 (2013). Another 
reason to reject the word “superior” here is the muddle that may arise if that term is taken to suggest that 
the source has greater merit, power, knowledge, or other value than the subject. Since that assumption 
would beg one of the central questions an analysis of authority is meant to illuminate, it hardly seems 
right to build the assumption into our terminology at the start.  
 4.  My use of the word ‘subject’ may give rise to similar difficulties raised in the previous 
footnote, but I plan to stick with it nonetheless. In so doing, I hope it is now clear that I do not mean to 
invoke the first definition offered in the Oxford English Dictionary: “subject: one who is under the 
dominion of a monarch or reigning prince; one who owes allegiance to a government or ruling power, is 
subject to its laws, and enjoys its protection.” Rather, I mean to invoke the sense of “subject” as a 
“conscious, thinking” subject – or, more specifically for my purposes, a practically reasoning subject. 
Subject, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50240711 (last 
visited December 10, 2021). 
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police officers directing traffic at busy intersections, with corresponding 
subjects as potential handgun-sellers or drivers approaching those busy 
intersections. Outside the legal system, typical sources include parents, 
bosses, and coaches, with corresponding subjects children, employees, 
and athletes.  
When a source issues a directive to a subject that the source claims to 
be authoritative, the source intends thereby to place the subject under an 
obligation to obey the directive. The central puzzle that has captured the 
imagination of legal philosophers regarding such directives has been, 
when, if ever, does a source’s claim of authority actually succeed in 
giving its subjects the kind of reason the source claims to give? Let us call 
this the puzzle of genuine authority. 
Many legal philosophers, myself included, do not regard the puzzle of 
genuine authority as terribly interesting, because we believe the obvious 
answer is “never.”  Let us call this view philosophical anarchism. 
According to philosophical anarchism, a source’s claim of authority never 
actually creates an obligation to obey on behalf of the subjects.5 Typically, 
this view is defended on grounds that any such obligation would violate 
the subjects’ autonomy. As Robert Paul Wolff (in)famously explained it: 
The primary obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled… 
Insofar as a man fulfills his obligation to make himself the author of his 
decisions, he will resist [a source’s] claim to have authority over him.6 
Let us call this the obligation of autonomy. According to this obligation, 
one must not obey, or, more precisely, one must not treat a source’s 
directive as if it entails an obligation to obey. There are strong and weak 
versions of the obligation of autonomy. According to the strong version, 
the obligation is absolute, and therefore any breach is unjustifiable. Let us 
call this an absolutist version of philosophical anarchism. According to a 
weaker, more modest, version of this obligation, a subject’s obedience 
may, under the right circumstances, be justified. This Article defends a 
modest version of philosophical anarchism: that is, it explains how it is 
possible that the obligation of autonomy (or something like it)7 is indeed 
a genuine obligation, while also explaining how breaches of the obligation 
can be justified. 
 
 5.  DAVID MILLER, ANARCHISM 17-18 (1984) (“[P]hilosophical anarchism is the view that no 
one can ever have legitimate authority over another person, and conversely, no one can ever be under an 
obligation to obey.”).  
 6.  ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENCE OF ANARCHISM 29 (1970). Wolff puts the point in terms 
of the state’s authority, but our concern here regards practical authority generally. 
 7.  Wolff’s formulation takes on what might be regarded as a strongly Kantian orientation, 
focusing on subjects as self-legislators. Below, we will craft a less Kantian version of the obligation and 
refer to it as the obligation to act according to one’s own lights. On whether Kant is best interpreted as 
defending a view of morality as self-legislation, see Pauline Kleingeld & Marcus Willaschek, Autonomy 
Without Paradox: Kant, Self-Legislation and the Moral Law 19(6) PHILOSOPHER’S IMPRINT 1 (2019). 
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Two points follow. First, because subjects breach the obligation of 
autonomy when they treat a directive as authoritative (when they obey 
claims of authority) it follows that obeying claims of authority calls for 
justification. Second, because sources try to get subjects to breach the 
obligation of autonomy when they issue directives (when they claim 
authority), it follows that claiming authority also calls for justification. 
John Gardner’s account of justification, alongside Joseph Raz’s service 
conception of authority, provides an illuminating set of tools for thinking 
about the conditions under which such justification may be secured.8 By 
putting that combination of intellectual influences to work in what follows 
in Parts II and III, this paper recommends solutions for three puzzles 
regarding authority, obedience, and justification: 
Puzzle #1: The Puzzle of Justified Authority 
When, if ever, is a source’s claim of authority justified? 
 
Puzzle #2: The Puzzle of Entailment9  
Do justified authoritative directives entail obligations to obey? 
 
Puzzle #3: The Puzzle of Obedience 
When, if ever, are subjects justified, or perhaps even duty-bound, in 
obeying claims of authority? 
Before setting out to solve these puzzles, however, we must first 
acquaint ourselves with the shape and content of the pieces. The next Part 
explains the conceptual tools we will use to solve these two puzzles. Part 
III proposes a solution to each. 
II. THE PIECES 
This Part unpacks a set of conceptual tools developed in the work of 
Joseph Raz and John Gardner, which enable us to solve the puzzles 
identified in Part I. Each piece of the puzzle is grounded in a conceptual 
 
 8.  See John Gardner, Justification and Reasons, in OFFENCES AND DEFENCES: SELECTED 
ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW, 91, 91-120 (2007) for an understanding of his account 
of justification.  See also RAZ, supra note 1; JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW 
AND MORALITY (2009); JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW 
AND POLITICS  (1995) [hereinafter ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN]; and Joseph Raz, The Problem of 
Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1003 (2006) for an overview of the service 
conception of authority. While this paper draws on tools developed in Gardner and Raz’s work, it makes 
no claim that either would endorse the way those tools are put to use here. Indeed, both are committed to 
the possibility of genuine authority in some cases, so it seems clear they would not endorse the weak 
version of philosophical anarchism assumed here.  
 9.  Abner Greene refers to this puzzle as the “principle of correlativity.” ABNER GREENE, 
AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, 24-34 
(2012). Greene endorses the principle of correlativity. As I have already outed myself as a philosophical 
anarchist, it will come as no surprise that I reject this principle.  
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tool concerning the philosophy of practical reasoning.  
Sections A and B of this Part begin with accounts of reasons and 
reasoning, respectively. With these basics in view, Sections C and D of 
this Part address the particular problems grounded in obedience to 
authority and claims of authority, respectively. Finally, Section E 
identifies the conceptual tools (pieces of the puzzle) required to explain 
how both obedience to authority and claims of authority can be justified.  
A. Reasons: Normative and Explanatory 
Reasons can be normative or explanatory.10 Normative reasons count 
in favor or against one’s performing an action, holding a belief, etc. They 
make something good or bad, right or wrong; they make it the case that 
we have reason to do or believe that thing. Explanatory reasons, as the 
name suggests, explain why one did or believed so. Let us take each in 
turn, focusing here on reasons for action. 
Normative reasons inform the quality of our actions. For example, if I 
were to walk past a child drowning in a shallow pond, the fact that I could 
stop and save the child’s life is a normative reason for me to do so. The 
existence of the normative reason does not mean that I must stop and save 
the child, all-things-considered. After all, I might have better things to 
do—such as saving ten drowning children in the next pond. Still, the fact 
that I could save the first child is a reason that speaks in favor of my doing 
so. The fact that I could save the child is a good-making feature of my 
doing so.  
Normative reasons sometimes weigh in favor of taking or refraining 
from action. If my smiling at a grumpy stranger walking down the street 
would cheer him up, then it is a normative reason for me to do so; 
conversely, if my smiling at the stranger would simply irritate him further, 
then it is a normative reason for me not to do so.  
Oftentimes, normative reasons conflict. If studying long and hard will 
contribute to one’s intellectual flourishing and promote one’s material 
well-being, these are normative reasons in favor of studying long and 
hard. Conversely, if studying long and hard will irreparably harm one’s 
 
 10.  See JOSEPH RAZ, FROM NORMATIVITY TO RESPONSIBILITY 16-20 (2011). The distinction 
bears similarities to the difference between what are called guiding reasons and explanatory reasons in 
Gardner, Justification and Reasons, supra note 8, at 91-95, and what Raz characterizes as the evaluative 
and guiding functions of reasons in JOSEPH RAZ, The Truth in Particularism, in ENGAGING REASON: ON 
THE THEORY OF VALUE AND ACTION, 218, 219 (1999) [hereinafter RAZ, ENGAGING REASON]. Some 
philosophers divide reasons into three: normative, explanatory, and motivating. Maria Alvarez, Reasons 
for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed. 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/ 
[https://perma.cc/P9YN-L5LS]. For our purposes here, the distinction between explanatory and 
motivating reasons is “excessively refined.” Id. 
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important personal relationships and turn one into a miserable, socially 
alienated recluse, these are normative reasons against studying long and 
hard.  
Acknowledging that normative reasons make actions good or bad, right 
or wrong, and so forth, is not to say that they do so in obvious or clear-
cut ways. It is no easy matter to determine if facts are normative reasons. 
Popular candidates for facts that constitute normative reasons include 
facts about consequences, deontic constraints, as well as the cultivation 
and expression of virtues.11 Moreover, as noted above, we often face 
conflicting normative reasons, making it difficult if not impossible to sort 
out which set of normative reasons prevails in any particular 
circumstance. Indeed, the incommensurability of some normative reasons 
often make them incomparable in terms of weight, strength, stringency, 
or any other criteria that would result in one reason (or set of reasons) 
defeating another.12 
Many times, indeed, perhaps most times, we are unaware of the full 
range of normative reasons that apply to our actions. Consider the case of 
driver vs. girl-on-bike. As I drive down the street toward an intersection, 
a large building on the corner blocks from my line of vision a young girl 
on her bicycle approaching the intersection. If I carry on at my current 
speed, I will strike the girl and kill her. The fact that the girl is approaching 
the intersection is a normative reason for me to slow down—but, ex 
hypothesi, I am unaware of this normative reason because of my inability 
to see her approaching. My lack of awareness that she is approaching the 
intersection does nothing to remove the force of the normative reason I 
have to slow down to avoid hitting her. Granted, my lack of awareness 
may make it impossible for me to act for that normative reason, but the 
normative reason nonetheless exists and applies to me as I drive down the 
street. 
Unknown and unknowable normative reasons for action are a common 
 
 11.  We do not need a fully developed moral theory to motivate the arguments that follow, since 
the structure of thought set out in this paper can accommodate a variety of moral theories, including the 
“big three” – Kantian deontological ethics, consequentialism, and virtue theory. See MARCIA BARON ET 
AL.,  THREE METHODS OF ETHICS (1997). I tend to think that reasons for action are grounded in the values 
that can be realized through our actions (albeit not necessarily in an instrumental/consequentialist way) 
and that such values are plural and frequently incommensurable. This line of thought follows the account 
developed in RAZ, ENGAGING REASON, supra note 10. While I do not claim to have a fully developed 
moral theory, the general approach in this paper is consistent with many of the intuitions that motivate the 
“big three” methods in ethical theory. 
 12.  It may be thought that such rational underdetermination speaks against a view of practical 
reasoning such as the one embraced here, which allows for unresolved conflicts of reason and 
incommensurability of reasons. To the contrary, however, such underdetermination is to be welcomed, 
since it is “primarily where matters are underdetermined by reason that we reveal and mould our 
distinctive individuality, our tastes, our imagination, our sociability, and many of our other, including our 
moral, characteristics.” RAZ, ENGAGING REASON, supra note 10, at 242. 
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feature of our moral lives. The constraints on our knowledge concern not 
only incomplete information regarding presently existing facts (such as 
the girl on her bicycle approaching the intersection), but the inability to 
predict with certainty what future states of affairs may be realized by our 
conduct. For example, I suspect that my smiling at the grumpy stranger 
will cheer him rather than irritate him, but at the moment I choose whether 
to smile, I can only predict the future impact of my action.13 Therefore, it 
is often impossible to know the normative reasons for acting in a given 
circumstance. 
Even when we are aware of the full range of normative reasons that 
apply to our practical circumstances, those reasons do not necessarily 
determine what should be done. Normative reasons may underdetermine 
action in at least two ways. First, conflicting normative reasons may be 
evenly matched, such that no reason or set of reasons stands triumphant 
on our rational horizon.14 Second, as noted above, normative reasons may 
be incommensurable, such that they cannot be compared in terms that 
would make some reasons superior to others.15  
Explanatory reasons, conversely, do not make an action good or bad, 
right or wrong.16 Rather, they explain one’s action—they are the reasons 
for which one acts: “that I was tired” is the reason I went to bed early; 
“that I was hungry” is the reason I got out of bed for a midnight snack; 
“that it would assuage my guilt” is the reason I woke up early to get to the 
gym. 
Often, let us hope, our normative and explanatory reasons match up 
well, such that one or more of our undefeated normative reasons features 
 
 13.  Perhaps he will be cheered. If so, the fact that he will be is a normative reason for me to` 
smile. Perhaps he will be irritated. If so, the fact that he will be is a normative reason for me not to smile. 
Perhaps he will be irritated at first, but cheered upon reflection later that day when he is feeling less 
grumpy. If so, I have a conflict of normative reasons: the fact that he will be irritated at first is a normative 
reason for me not to smile now, but the fact that he will be cheered later is a normative reason for me to 
smile now. In any event, note that some of the normative reasons that apply to me as I take or decline to 
take the action of smiling are sensitive to states of affairs that will exist in the future - states of affairs that 
I may (or may not) bring about through my action. 
 14.  Various metaphors have been employed by philosophers to capture the sense in which 
normative reasons conflict with one another. Typically, the metaphors draw on notions of weight or 
strength: one set of reasons outweighs another; one set of reasons is stronger than the others. In what 
follows, I will follow Gardner and Macklem in referring to one reason or set of reasons defeating others. 
See John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, Reasons, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 440 (Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). 
 15.  The normative reasons in favor of studying long and hard may not defeat those against doing 
so, and visa-versa. Once the battle of conflicting reasons is finished, there may be nothing more to say for 
one side than the other – and, in such cases, normative reasons fail to determine (underdetermine) whether 
to push on with further studying or pack it in and go socialize with friends. 
 16.  Explanatory reasons may, however, make it the case that we have reason to perform (or avoid 
performing) an action. For example, see Raz’s discussion of Peter Winch’s analysis of Billy Budd. Raz, 
ENGAGING REASON, supra note 10, at 239-246 (discussing Peter Winch, The Universalizability of Moral 
Judgements, in ETHICS AND ACTION 159 (1972). 
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amongst our explanatory reasons. When a good friend requests a ride to 
the airport, I typically have any number of normative reasons to provide 
the ride. Reasons of friendship, beneficence, and others, all weigh in favor 
of giving her a ride and are therefore normative reasons to do so. Indeed, 
under the right conditions, her making the request itself gives me a reason 
to give her a ride.17 Yet, other reasons, although self-serving, might also 
weigh in favor of me giving her a ride, such as wanting to stop by the 
outlet shopping mall on the way home from the airport or ensure her 
indebtedness to me in the future. 
We can see from this example that the moral quality of our actions 
consists not merely in whether we conform to our undefeated normative 
reasons, but also the reasons for which we act in so doing.18 Put simply, 
in practical reasoning, our explanatory reasons matter. If I drive my friend 
to the airport and take as my explanatory reasons only those that concern 
my own benefit, I stand in a different moral position than if my 
explanatory reasons are reasons of friendship, beneficence, etc. The self-
serving explanatory reasons hardly show me to be a moral leper, but 
because my actions cannot be explained in terms of friendship or 
beneficence, I am in fact in a somewhat less commendable moral 
position.19  
Agents can be mistaken, of course, about the normative reasons that 
apply to them. As discussed above in the case of the driver vs. girl-on-
bike, one may be mistaken because she failed to recognize some of the 
normative reasons she had to stop her car. Conversely, an agent may also 
be mistaken because she followed normative reasons she actually did not 
have. During the first (too many) years of my marriage, for example, I 
would occasionally do the dishes after dinner because I thought doing so 
was doing a kindness to my partner. Little did I know that he enjoyed 
doing dishes, so there was no normative reason in favor of my doing 
dishes that fell under the heading “doing a kindness to my partner.” In 
doing the dishes, I mistakenly took myself to have an explanatory reason 
that I did not have.20  
In both of these ways, one may have explanatory reasons that do not 
 
 17.  See David Enoch, Giving Practical Reasons, 11  PHILOSOPHERS’ IMPRINT 4, at 1 (2011) 
(explaining how requests can give reasons). 
 18.  See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 19.  While both reasons of friendship and beneficence, as well as self-serving reasons, are 
undefeated, the former are what Gardner calls “privileged reasons,” or reasons of the kind such that “acting 
for that reason lends special value to one’s action.” Gardner, Justification and Reasons, supra note 8, at 
104 (explaining that “[b]y acting in the same way for different privileged reasons people normally exhibit 
their incomparably different virtues.”). 
 20.  My dishwashing example is innocuous, but more troubling instances arise throughout the 
criminal law, as in cases where defendants in rape cases claim they acted on the (mistaken) belief that the 
victim welcomed the sexual intercourse. See DPP. v. Morgan [1976] AC (HL) 182.  
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match-up to her normative reasons: she may fail to see (and thus fail to 
act for) normative reasons she actually has or mistakenly believes she has 
(and thus act for) normative reasons that she actually does not have.21 
Weakness of will is another common phenomenon resulting in a 
mismatch between one’s normative reasons and one’s explanatory 
reasons. It consists of being inadequately responsive to the rational force 
of one’s undefeated normative reasons, and/or being overly responsive to 
the rational force of one’s defeated normative reasons. Anyone who has 
skipped an early morning run on a chilly, dark winter morning 
understands this phenomenon. The fact that running will improve your 
energy and mood throughout the day, promote your overall health, and 
cultivate healthy habits are all normative reasons for you to get out of bed 
and go for a run. The fact that the bed is warm and comforting, and that 
you were having a good dream when the alarm went off, which you will 
be able to recapture if you keep your eyes shut, are normative reasons for 
staying in bed (albeit ones which, let us assume, are defeated by the 
reasons in favor of going for the run). As you lie there debating the matter, 
you find yourself drawn in by the rational force of the reasons for staying 
in bed. You do not kid yourself into thinking that these reasons genuinely 
defeat the reasons in favor of going for the run. Heck, you may even 
acknowledge to yourself the likelihood that you will feel guilty later for 
having blown off the run. But by this time, your fate is sealed. You roll 
over and snuggle into the warm blankets, taking defeated normative 
reasons as your explanatory reasons because of weakness of will.  
With the distinction between normative and explanatory practical 
reasons now in view, we can clarify the obligation of autonomy that 
animates the concerns of the philosophical anarchists. As stated above in 
the quote from Wolff, the central obligation that philosophical anarchists 
insist upon is that we make ourselves the author of our own decisions. For 
Wolff, this obligation was tied up in a Kantian conception of moral 
 
 21.  Another way in which a mismatch between one’s normative reasons and one’s explanatory 
reasons can arise involves misjudging the normative valence of a reason – such as a parent who explains 
inflicting a painful spanking on a child in terms such as “a good smack never hurt anybody - it does her 
good.” The normative valence of inflicting pain on the child is actually negative (let us assume) but the 
parent misjudges it to be positive. In other, hopefully rare cases, a mismatch between one’s normative 
reasons and one’s explanatory reasons can arise when one affirmatively chooses to act against her 
normative reasons. Consider the possibility of serial torture-killers, who treat the fact that their conduct 
causes agony and death as an explanatory reason to continue doing what they are doing, while nonetheless 
recognizing that the agony and death they cause are normative reasons against their actions. In such cases, 
one recognizes a reason as a normative reason not to do something, and yet takes that very reason as an 
explanatory reason to do that very thing. (Philosophers debate the possibility of such cases, with Socrates 
taking the view that no one willingly chooses to do wrong. See PLATO’s GORGIAS (Robin Waterfield 
trans., Oxford World Press 2008). Here, I set myself against the Socratic view.  
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autonomy22—but we may approach the issue in a slightly different way, 
simply by emphasizing the values that can be realized through rational 
human beings engaging in moral deliberation and attentive to the salience 
and responsive to the force of the normative reasons that apply in many 
and varied circumstances.23 For shorthand, let us refer to this (less Kantian 
and more modest) version of the philosophical anarchist’s duty as an 
obligation to act according to one’s own lights.  
The distinction between normative and explanatory reasons helps 
further specify the content of this obligation: to act according to one’s 
own lights is an obligation to act according to explanatory reasons that 
one has discerned for oneself. We will specify the content of this 
obligation further in the next Section.  
B. Evaluating Practical Reasoning: What We Do and Why We Do It 
When we engage in practical reasoning, we face at least two 
challenges: (1) to do the right thing,24 and (2) to do so by our own lights. 
One may be justified in failing to meet one or both challenges, but the 
point is simply that there are two aspects of practical reasoning that must 
be assessed: what one does and why one does it.25 
Ideally, when one acts, she conforms and acts according to her 
normative reasons (that is, she takes them as her explanatory reasons) 
because she is both aware of and sensitive to the value-ladened facts that 
make them normative reasons, and she is appropriately responsive to the 
rational force of those reasons.26 In such cases, she does the right thing 
for the right reasons. No problem.  
 
 22.  WOLFF, supra note 6. There is disagreement in the philosophical literature regarding the degree 
to which Wolff helps himself to a Kantian account of autonomy in defending his particular version of 
philosophical anarchism. On Wolff’s reliance on Kant, compare MILLER, supra note 5, with Patrick Riley, 
On the “Kantian” Foundations of Robert Paul Wolff’s Anarchism, 19 NOMOS 294 (1978). My thanks to 
Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco for pressing me on this concern. For another less Kantian version of Wolff’s 
philosophical anarchism, see Matthew Smith, Political Obligation and the Self, 86 PHILOSOPHY AND 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, 2, 384 (2011). Thankfully, however, we need not resolve the debate here 
to motivate the modest philosophical anarchism that informs this article. 
 23.  Seana Shiffrin highlights the value of moral deliberation regarding the content of legal norms 
both for our individual “moral health and for an active, engaged democratic citizenry.” Seana Shiffrin, 
Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1217 (2010). 
 24.  By ‘right’ here I mean weak-permissibility, which need not be the best choice under the 
circumstances, but may be merely a permissible choice. On the distinction between weak and strong 
permissibility, see MATTHEW KRAMER, WHERE LAW AND MORALITY MEET  280-283 (2004). 
 25.  On a fuller account of practical reasoning, the question of excuse would arise. Excuses are a 
fall-back position, which block blameworthiness in cases where one’s conduct is nonetheless unjustified 
all-things-considered. Excuses are beyond the scope of my concern here. For an account of excuse 
consistent with this view, see JOHN GARDNER, The Gist of Excuses, in OFFENCES AND DEFENSES, 
supra note 8, at 121 (2007). 
 26.  On reasons as value-ladened facts, see Gardner and Macklem, supra note 14. 
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In some cases, however, one might do the right thing for the wrong 
reasons. Consider the dilemma faced by a mother who, having read Amy 
Chua’s BATTLE HYMN OF THE TIGER MOTHER, is faced with the challenge 
of deciding whether and how strongly to push her young daughter to 
continue practicing a song on the piano that the daughter finds difficult to 
master.27 The daughter resists, cries, and stamps her feet. The hour grows 
late and her bedtime passes. Should the mother persist? According to 
Chua, the answer is yes. Citing her own experience in which she yelled at 
her daughter to the point of losing her voice, forced her daughter to 
continue practicing late into the night without bathroom or water breaks, 
and effectively turned their home into what she characterized as a “war 
zone,” Chua stood triumphant in this epic battle of will between mother 
and daughter. In the end, the daughter learned the song, and her self-
esteem was enhanced by learning she could do something she thought she 
could not.  
Should our hypothetical mother continue to force her daughter to 
practice? What should she do? Given the discussion in Section II-A, the 
question is to be answered according to the normative reasons for and 
against the mother’s persisting. Let us assume that the mother’s 
persistence will ultimately result in the girl learning the song, gaining 
enhanced self-esteem, developing her talents, and contributing positively 
to a flourishing life; any upset caused by the mother’s persistence will be 
quickly forgotten and not do any serious harm to the daughter or the 
mother-child relationship.28 Under these stipulations, we can assume that 
the normative reasons in favor of persisting remain undefeated. If the 
mother persists, she has done the right thing. 
A second question, regarding the quality of the mother’s practical 
reasoning, remains: if persisting is the right thing to do in the above 
scenario, then why did she do it?  The question here is not, however, what 
makes it the case that persisting in forcing her daughter to practice the 
piano is the right thing to do? That question was already answered by 
reference to the undefeated normative reasons in favor of persisting (her 
daughter’s development of talent, self-esteem, and flourishing). Rather, 
the question of why the mother persisted speaks to the quality of her 
practical reasoning in terms of her explanatory reasons. On one version 
of the story, we might imagine that the mother treated Chua’s advice as a 
directive to be obeyed. In this version, the mother persists only because 
 
 27.  AMY CHUA, BATTLE HYMN OF THE TIGER MOTHER (2011). For a summary recounting the 
story set out here, see Amy Chua, Why Chinese Mothers are Superior, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Jan. 8, 
2011, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704111504576059713528698754.  
 28.  And, even more artificially, let us assume that these considerations exhaust the range of 
normative reasons in play. Clearly, in real life, things are not so simple. I tend to think the reasons weigh 
up differently in most cases like the one Chua sets out, but perhaps this fact merely shows me to be a 
misguided or weak-willed mother. 
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Chua said so, thereby treating Chua’s advice as an authoritative 
directive.29 On another version of the story, we might imagine that the 
mother acted according to her own lights: she sorted out for herself the 
normative reasons that weighed in favor of persisting (her daughter’s 
talents, self-esteem, flourishing), recognized the salience of those reasons, 
and was appropriately responsive to the rational force behind those 
reasons, such that she was sufficiently motivated to persist, despite her 
own exhaustion and desire to pack it in and go to sleep. 
According to the idea presented here, the mother’s practical reasoning 
stands to be evaluated according to both of these questions: the quality of 
what she did—and the quality of why she did it. Even if persisting is the 
right thing to do, if the mother treats Chua’s advice as an authoritative 
directive to be obeyed, then the mother has thereby breached her 
obligation to act according to her own lights, and this breach calls for 
justification.  
Note that there are two ways in which one might breach the obligation 
to act according to one’s own lights. Above, we specified the content of 
this obligation as requiring one to act according to explanatory reasons 
that one has discerned for oneself. Yet, further recall that we identified 
the grounds of this obligation in terms that went beyond Kantian-inspired 
notions of self-legislation relied on by Wolff.30 Instead, we identified the 
grounds of the obligation in terms of the values that may be realized 
through rational human beings engaging in moral deliberation, attentive 
to the salience and responsive to the force of the normative reasons that 
apply in many and varied circumstances. The obligation to act according 
to one’s own lights is thus grounded not merely in refusing to be ruled by 
another’s will but also engaging in our own practical reasoning: that is, 
there is value in exercising our human capacity to recognize and respond 
appropriately to the balance of genuine normative reasons applicable in 
any given circumstance. Acting according to one’s own lights, thus, 
requires not merely that one act according to reasons already discerned 
for oneself (one’s own lights); those reasons must be ones that genuinely 
illuminate the right course of action (one’s own lights).31 
We will return to this point below, but first let us examine how 
obedience to claims of authority constitutes breaching the obligation to 
act according to one’s own lights.  
 
 29.  See discussion of authority in Sections II. C and D infra. 
 30.  I take no view on how genuinely Kantian Wolff’s account is. See narrative text accompanying  
note 22. 
 31.  RAZ, supra note 1 at 57, commenting on the “intrinsic desirability of people conducting their 
own life by their own lights.”  
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C. Obedience: Treating Directives as if They Were Genuinely 
Authoritative 
When a source issues a directive that the source claims is an 
authoritative directive, the source intends thereby to place the subject 
under an obligation to obey the directive. The subject treats that directive 
as if it were authoritative insofar as the subject obeys the directive.  
To obey a directive is to allow it to play a special role in one’s practical 
reasoning. Specifically, to obey a directive is to treat it as a protected 
reason for action: a first-order reason to φ32 plus an exclusionary reason 
not to refrain from φ-ing for (some set of) reasons the subject may have 
not to φ.33 Another way to express this idea is to say that one treats the 
reason as if it has mandatory force.34 Further, to obey directives is to treat 
 
 32.  In the philosophical literature regarding practical reasoning, and especially in Raz and 
Gardner’s work, the symbol φ is used as a universal placeholder for an unspecified action. 
 33.  On protected reasons, see JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 39-40, 178-199 
(2nd ed. 1990) [hereinafter RAZ, P.R.N.]. In explaining the notion of protected reasons to my students, I 
invite them to think of reasons as children on a school playground. (I suspect the following metaphor is 
inspired by the idea of reasons being “in play” on one’s rational horizons.) Some of the children favor 
playing baseball (option A), while others favor soccer (option B): which is to say, some of the first order 
normative reasons favor option A, while others favor option B. Think of a protected reason as the new kid 
who walks onto the playground, surrounded by protective force of his tough friends – and in response (at 
least some of) the other kids scatter off the playground. If the new kid favors playing baseball (that is, if 
the protected reason is a reason that favors option A), then the case for playing baseball just got that much 
stronger. Precisely, it got stronger in two different ways: (1) we now have a new kid who favors playing 
baseball (that is, the protected reason in favor of option A adds another first-order reason supporting the 
case for option A); and (2) some or all of the kids who favor playing soccer instead of baseball have 
scattered off the playground for fear of the new kid’s tough friends (that is, the exclusionary force that 
accompanies the protected reason excludes some or all of the reasons that favor “not option A”).  
  When all is said and done, the effect of adding the new kid, with his tough friends, into the 
mix makes it more likely that the case for playing baseball will prevail. (That is, the combination of the 
protected reason’s first and second order normative force can go a long way toward making it the case 
that the reasons in favor of option A stand undefeated.) Still, the new kid’s tough friends might not exclude 
every child who favors playing soccer, (That is, the scope of a protected reason’s exclusionary force may 
be relatively narrow, such that some reasons against option A remain in play). And, so, it might be that 
the case for playing soccer prevails despite the effect of the new kid and his tough friends. As such, the 
fact that one has a protected reason in favor of option A does not fully determine the question of what 
should be done, all-things-considered.  
  Note, as well, that the new kid’s tough friends merely kick-off other children from the 
playground - they do not kill them. (That is, the exclusionary force of a protected reason merely excludes 
reasons; it does not cancel the reasons.) The children who have been forced off the playground remain 
nearby, and while their case for playing soccer at that time and place may have been defeated, we may 
now have residual reasons to satisfy those children - say, by allowing them a turn to play soccer later – or 
taking them to a movie, ice cream, etc. In this way, even excluded reasons can bear residual normative 
force. Gardner explains these residual reasons in the context of his “continuity thesis.” John Gardner, 
What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 LAW & PHIL. 1 (2011). For further 
discussion of the moral residue of excluded reasons, see Michelle Madden Dempsey, Against Liability: 
Toward a Reasons-Based Account of Self-Defense, in THE ETHICS OF SELF-DEFENSE (Christopher Coons 
and Michael Weber, eds., 2016). 
 34.  Gardner and Macklem, supra note 14, at 465. 
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them as generating content-independent reasons. In so doing, the subject 
supposes that the directives are reasons “simply because they have been 
issued and not because they direct subjects to perform actions that are 
independently justifiable.”35  
Irrespective of whether a directive is genuinely authoritative (that is, 
whether it actually gives the subject the kind of reason for action that it 
claims to give), the subject can nonetheless treat the directive as if it has 
done so. That is, the subject can treat the directive as a content-
independent protected-reason. 
Putting these conditions together, we can understand what obedience 
entails in considering my son’s response to a directive I might issue to 
him such as, “Clean your room.” First, however, note the difference 
between a directive (“Clean your room.”) and a request (“Will you please 
clean your room?”) and a suggestion (“Hey, buddy, you really should 
clean your room.”). The form of words is not the key, because the speaker 
could intend any of the three formulations to constitute an authoritative 
directive.36 But the distinction between claims of authority, requests, and 
suggestions still holds. In the first directive, the speaker (source) intends 
the audience (subject) to obey the request. In the second, the speaker 
intends the audience to take the request as a first order reason for cleaning 
the room. In the third, the speaker intends to impact the audience’s 
theoretical reasoning and not his practical reasoning.37 
If I say to my son, who sits happily playing Minecraft, “Clean your 
room,” and he treats the directive as if it were authoritative, he thereby 
obeys it. In so doing, he allows the directive to play a special role in his 
practical reasoning. He treats the directive as a content-independent 
reason to clean his room (“because mom said so”) which bears the force 
of a protected-reason, thereby excluding from his rational horizons 
reasons that weigh against cleaning his room (e.g., that playing Minecraft 
is totally awesome).  
Obeying a directive is not merely doing what the directive would 
 
 35.  Scott Shapiro, Authority, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 383, 389 (Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). See also GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE 
STATE, supra note 3, at 40-42; H.L.A. HART, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in ARTICLES 
ON BENTHAM 243 (1982). 
 36.  The formulation of the request would thus be intended to mean, “I’m telling you to clean your 
room.” My partner frequently fails to grasp this distinction, which invariably results in our smart-aleck 
son not cleaning his room and later claiming the defense of “Well, you never told me to clean my room” 
- proving once more that legal philosophy is good training for effective parenting. 
 37.  Theoretical reasoning concerns our thoughts/beliefs, whereas practical reasoning concerns our 
actions. R. Jay Wallace, Practical Reason, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. 
Zalta ed., 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/practical-reason/ [https://perma.cc/ 
W46U-4RQ3]. In making a suggestion, the speaker intends to influence the listener’s thinking about what 
to do – to plant an idea – specifically, here, the idea that my son should clean his room.  
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instruct one to do.38 In the example above, my son does not obey my 
directive to clean his room simply by cleaning his room. Rather, before 
we can know whether he has obeyed the directive, we need to know why 
he cleaned his room. To clarify this point, compare obedience to two other 
ways a subject might respond the source’s directive: conformity or 
compliance.39 
Conforming to a directive is simply doing what the directive would 
have one do, without the directive playing a role in one’s rational 
horizons. Imagine that my son was so enraptured with a game of 
Minecraft that he did not even hear me when I said, “Clean your room” 
(not hard to imagine, trust me). By shocking coincidence, shortly after I 
issue the directive, he gets tired of the game, goes upstairs, and cleans his 
room of his own volition—completely oblivious to the fact that I have 
directed him to do so. Such cases, impossibly rare with children cleaning 
their rooms, are common in other contexts. I drive down the road, 
unaware of the speed limit, but by coincidence I happen to drive within 
the limit. The question, “What is the speed limit?” never occurs to me; I 
just drive at what I take to be a safe and reasonable speed under the 
circumstances, and I manage to conform to the speed limit. Similarly, 
while I am aware of a legal directive with the content, “Do not murder,” 
and I always conform to that directive, I have never once obeyed it. That 
is, I have never treated the prohibition on murder as a content-
independent, protected reason for not murdering. Thankfully, I have never 
felt tempted to murder anyone, so in weighing up my first-order reasons 
for acting, it has always seemed to me that the option “Do not murder” 
has been the right way to go.  
Complying with a directive falls somewhere between obeying and 
conforming. When one complies with a directive, she treats it as a reason 
for action, to be added to her other first-order reasons. She might treat the 
directive as a weighty reason or simply a ninety-eight pound weakling of 
a reason—either way, the gist of compliance is three-fold: (1) while the 
subject does indeed allow the directive to have some impact on her 
rational horizons, (2) she does not allow it to have the exclusionary force 
of a protected reason, and (3) the strength of the reason is assessed, at 
least in part, according to its merits and not merely its source. I suspect 
that most people regard most claims of authority as occasions for 
 
 38.  However, compare this account of obedience to that of Michael Sevel, who argues that “to 
obey the law a person must act with some recognition that she is in fact doing an action which the law 
requires.” This account of obedience requires no acknowledgment of laws special authority. Michael 
Sevel, Obeying the Law, 24 LEGAL THEORY 191, 194 (2018). 
 39.  Whereas the account of obedience in Sevel, supra note 38, is at odds with what I present in 
this paper, his accounts of conformity and compliance are similar. “To comply with a reason is to act for 
that reason; to conform to a reason is simply to do the action for which the reason is a reason, but not to 
act for that reason.” Id. at 197. 
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compliance rather than obedience. Speed limits and stop signs are treated 
as first order reasons to adjust one’s speed or stop one’s car—and these 
reasons are regarded as stronger or weaker depending on the 
circumstances. As such, while driving down a crowded street at midday, 
the directives to follow the laws of the road will be given far greater 
weight than they would while driving along an empty country road in the 
middle of the night.40  
According to the strong version of philosophical anarchism, it is always 
absolutely wrong to treat a directive as if it were authoritative. In other 
words, obedience is always unjustifiable. According to the more 
plausible, modest version of philosophical anarchism adopted here, 
treating the directives of others as if they were authoritative (that is, 
obeying others) calls for justification. Obedience may be justified or 
unjustified in any given case, but it is not always unjustifiable. The 
conditions establishing justified obedience will be discussed below in 
Section III.C. But first, let us examine why obedience calls for 
justification. 
Obedience calls for justification because it violates the obligation to act 
according to one’s own lights. It violates this obligation in two ways. 
First, treating a directive that has been issued by someone else (or 
something else41) as a content-independent reason for action calls for 
justification because, in so doing, the subject submits her will to the 
source’s directive. Its pro tanto wrongfulness lies in the threat it poses to 
the moral autonomy of the subject who has submitted her will to the will 
of the source.42 Primarily, it is this aspect of obedience that vexes Wolff 
when he states that the “primary obligation of man is autonomy, the 
refusal to be ruled…”43 
Second, treating a directive as a protected reason calls for justification 
because, in so doing, the subject fails to weigh-up her first-order reasons 
for herself. Instead, she excludes (at least some of) her first-order reasons 
from her practical rational horizons. In a one-off situation, allowing 
 
 40.  I am indebted to John Gardner for the example.  
 41.  See Stephen Perry, Two Problems of Political Authority, 6 AM. PHIL. ASS’N. NEWSL. ON PHIL. 
OF L. 31 (2007) (discussing the authority of a black box) [hereinafter Perry, Two Problems of Political 
Authority], and Stephen Perry, Political Authority and Political Obligation, in 2 OXFORD STUDIES IN 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 49 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2013) [hereinafter Perry, Political Authority]. 
 42.  On pro tanto wrongness, see GARDNER, Justification and Reasons, supra note 8, at 95-97. 
Gardner used the phrase “prima facie” (at first sight) rather than “pro tanto” (to an extent), but I follow 
Shelley Kagan here in thinking the phrase “pro tanto” captures the point more clearly. SHELLEY KAGAN, 
THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 17 (1989). “Calling an action [‘pro tanto wrong’] is intended to affirm that the 
action really is wrong, while leaving open the further question of whether the wrongdoing is justified. By 
the same token, an action that is ‘all things considered wrong’ is not merely a wrong action. It is a [wrong] 
action and also (a quite separate matter) an unjustified one.” JOHN GARDNER, In Defence of Defences, in 
OFFENCES AND DEFENCES, supra note 8, at 77, 78. 
 43.  WOLFF, supra note 6. 
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protected reasons to structure one’s rational horizons in this way is 
unlikely to have any substantial impact on one’s ability to engage in 
practical reasoning—but when obedience to authority becomes frequent, 
it tends to weaken one’s practical rational capacities. In this sense, 
rationality is like a muscle: use it or lose it. Our rational capacities, 
including the capacity to discern the salience of our normative reasons 
and appropriately respond to the rational force of those reasons are central 
to our humanity. As such, obedience to authority (or at least frequent or 
habituated obedience) has the tendency to weaken these capacities, 
thereby rendering one less fully human. For this reason, as well, 
obedience to authority calls for justification.44  
D. Claiming Authority: Claiming to Give Obligations to Obey  
Sources issue directives that they claim are authoritative. Claims of 
authority are claims to give subjects reasons. Above, we characterized the 
kind of reason that sources claim to give subjects in terms of the intended 
impact on the subject’s horizons. Namely, the source claims to be able to 
give the subject obligations to obey: to treat the directives as content-
independent, protected reasons for action.45 In this Section, we further 
unpack what it means to say that a source claims to give the subject 
obligations to obey and why sources that make such claims stand in need 
of justification for doing so. 
As David Enoch has helpfully explained, when we say someone (A) 
gives a reason to someone else (B), we might mean any one of three 
distinct things.46 First, we might simply mean that A identified for B the 
reasons that already applied to B. After a long house-hunt, you remain 
undecided about which house to purchase. Your friend observes, “You 
should buy the one on Mocking Bird Lane,” to which you reply, “Give 
me a reason.” The friend then lists all of the normative reasons that weigh 
 
 44.  This dynamic is particularly acute in regard to the law’s claims of authority. Law’s claims 
over its subjects are typically diachronic in virtue of law’s continuity and persistence. See H.L.A. HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 51-66 (3rd ed., 2012). Moreover, the law’s claims of authority are typically 
comprehensive, in virtue of law’s generality. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46-49 (1964). Both 
of these qualities, of course, vary with respect to particular laws. Examples can be found in which law’s 
claims of authority lack the continuity, persistence and generality typical of law in its central case (for 
example, a restraining order issued by a judge, applicable only to one person, for a limited time). 
Nonetheless, laws (as rules) are necessarily susceptible to being applied across more than one case and 
thus bear some hallmarks of continuity, persistence and/or generality. See also John Gardner, The Legality 
of Law, 17 RATIO JURIS 168, 180 (2004). 
 45.  Compare NOAM GUR, LEGAL DIRECTIVES AND PRACTICAL REASONS (2018) (arguing against 
the generally Razian account that informs my approach, in favor of a view that law claims to give reasons 
to adopt a law-abiding attitude). See also Gur’s discussion of Raz’s account with non-Razian “weighing 
accounts.” Id. 12-17. 
 46.  See Enoch, Giving Practical Reasons, supra note 17; David Enoch, Authority and Reason-
Giving, 89 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 296 (2012). 
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in favor of buying the house on Mocking Bird Lane (it is larger than the 
others, on a hill and thus less apt to flood, of newer and better 
construction, closer to work and excellent schools), and she explains why 
the reasons you perceive to weigh in favor of your other options are not 
as weighty as you think (yes, the neighbors on Magnolia Drive are nicer, 
but they might move soon; the house on James Road is less expensive on 
its own, but the property taxes at that location are very high). Enoch refers 
to this kind of reason-giving as “epistemic reason-giving.”47 As he 
correctly observes, epistemic reason-giving consists in A’s simply 
pointing out the normative reasons that already apply to B, so that B 
comes to learn what was true for her all along.48  
Second, we might mean that A altered the circumstances that apply to 
B, triggering the application of a conditional normative reason that 
already applied to B. As Enoch explains: 
By placing his foot on the road, a pedestrian can give a driver a reason to 
stop, but only because the driver had all along, and independently of the 
pedestrian’s actions, the conditional reason to-stop-should-a-pedestrian-
start-crossing. By placing his foot on the road, the pedestrian thus triggers 
this pre-existing reason, thereby giving the driver a reason to stop.49 
Similarly, the fact that someone at a nearby university organizes an 
interesting legal philosophy conference gives me a reason to attend the 
conference. I correctly think to myself, “I should really attend that 
conference,” and I set out to see if I can manage to find the time to attend. 
The reason they give me is not merely epistemic. The organizers are not 
merely conveying to me that there will be an interesting conference that, 
all-things-considered, I should find the time to attend. Instead, by 
organizing the conference, they are creating the circumstance that an 
interesting legal philosophy conference will be conducted at a time and 
place that gives me a reason to attend.50  
Still, there seems to be an important difference between the way in 
which the organizers give me a reason to attend in the case where they 
simply make the conference a reality and ask me to attend the conference. 
Once my attendance has been requested, I seem to have a different kind 
of reason to attend, one that exists by virtue of their request. Enoch 
identifies this final category of reason-giving as robust reason-giving.51 
On his account, robust reason-giving is a special case of triggering-reason 
 
 47.  Enoch, Giving Practical Reasons, supra note 17, at 5. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 4. 
 50.  The time and place are auxiliary reasons. The operative reason is the fact that it will be an 
interesting conference and, let us assume, the fact that there is intrinsic value in doing legal philosophy. 
On operative and auxiliary reasons, see RAZ, P.R.N., supra note 33, at 33-35. 
 51.  Enoch, Giving Practical Reasons, supra note 17. 
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giving, and it carries a kind of “magical normative force” shared by 
actions such as requesting, promising, and issuing authoritative 
directives.52 Unlike cases of ordinary triggering reason-giving, robust 
reason-giving involves cases where the request, promise, or authoritative 
directive are constitutive of the normative reasons for following the 
directive.  
John Gardner helpfully clarifies Enoch’s framework with the following 
heuristic.53 Starting with a practical syllogism in mind, we can think of 
epistemic reason-giving as simply pointing out the full practical 
syllogism; we can think of triggering reason-giving as making some 
change to a minor premise; and we can think of robust reason-giving as 
bringing into existence a new major premise.  
The central claim of philosophical anarchism is that sources can never 
give the kind of reasons they claim to give in this robust way. That is, they 
cannot give content-independent, protected reasons. Directives issued by 
A cannot introduce into practical syllogisms that apply to B new major 
premises that bear exclusionary force on B’s rational horizons, and that 
exist in virtue of A’s say-so, without regard to the major premises’ 
merits.54 Moreover, as discussed above, for B to treat A’s directive as if 
it had this power (that is, to obey the directive) is to violate B’s obligation 
to act according to her own lights, so obedience calls for justification. 
Relatedly, when sources issue directives that they claim are 
authoritative, those claims stand in need of justification as well. The 
relation is best understood as parasitic upon the fact that obedience calls 
for justification. Given this fact about the moral quality of obedience, a 
claim of authority over potentially obedient subjects calls for justification 
in its own right. Thus, as noted previously, issuing directives which claim 
to be authoritative calls for justification, because such directives 
constitute attempts to get subjects to obey, and the issuance of such 
directives present a risk that the subjects will indeed obey.  
Primarily, it is not a claim of authority alone that calls for justification 
 
 52.  Enoch, Authority and Reason, supra note 46 at 300. 
 53.  Gardner’s contribution is discussed at Enoch, Giving Practical Reasons, supra note 17, at 12. 
 54.  Whether requests and promises can ever amount to robust reason giving is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Enoch makes a strong case for thinking that what he calls the “normative success conditions” 
for robust reason-giving can be present in many instances of requests and promises, and I do not disagree. 
Yet, when it comes to commands (directives issued by sources that the source claims are authoritative), 
the normative success conditions seem all but impossible to satisfy. It is difficult to imagine how there 
could be a pre-existing, independent, general reason for B to treat A's order to φ as a content-independent, 
pre-emptive reason for φ-ing. For Enoch’s normative success conditions to be satisfied, it would have to 
be the case that B (generally and diachronically) should not reason for herself but should instead obey A. 
We could imagine such conditions being satisfied in special cases, such as where B is brain-damaged or 
otherwise rationally impaired in a profound way that defies rehabilitation – but it is difficult to imagine 
how these could be satisfied in the standard case. Enoch, Authority and Reason-Giving, supra note 46 at 
313-314.  
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but instead the risk of obedience posed by such a claim. If each claim 
were wholly ineffective in inducing obedience, they would not need 
justification for the reasons outlined here. Consider the elder sibling who 
frequently tells her younger siblings how to live their lives, issuing 
directives rather than offering advice. If her claims of authority have no 
impact whatsoever on her siblings’ practical reasoning, her conduct does 
not call for justification under the problem of authority (of course, it may 
call for justification under a different problem though, like nagging or 
being a buttinsky). The point is, wholly ineffective claims of authority 
make no practical difference to anyone and therefore do not call for 
justification qua claims of authority.55  
E. Justification: Distinguishing the Justifiable from the Justified  
Pro tanto wrongdoings, including inter alia breaches of our 
obligations, call for justification.56 If full justification is secured, then our 
pro tanto wrongdoing is not wrong, all-things-considered. Thus, as 
discussed below, while breaching a promise is pro tanto wrong, if doing 
so is justified, then the breach is not wrong all-things-considered. So too, 
as discussed below, cutting into the living body of another human being 
is pro tanto wrong, but in cases where the cutting is justified, it is not 
wrong all-things-considered.  
The process of justification is two-fold. The distinction between the 
two steps in the process marks the divide between that which is justifiable 
and that which is justified.57 To say that something is justifiable is, first, 
to say that it calls for justification at the outset, and second, that there were 
undefeated normative reasons weighing in its favor. Thus, while your 
breaching a promise to meet a colleague for lunch calls for justification, 
your child having a serious accident and needing you to rush her to the 
hospital is an undefeated reason in favor of missing the lunch, which 
makes your breach of the promise justifiable. So, too, while it is true that 
cutting into a living person’s body calls for justification, it being part of a 
life-saving surgical procedure is an undefeated reason in favor of cutting. 
 
 55.  When it comes to claims of authority made through legal directives, it is widely recognized, 
as a conceptual matter, that law must be a de facto authority in the sense explained here. Leslie Green, 
Legal Obligation and Authority, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 
2012), https://perma.cc/F4VT-FV84. Yet, of course, that law is treated as a de facto authority by many 
does not entail that law succeeds in robustly giving the kinds of reasons it claims to give (content-
independent, protected reasons). 
 56.  On pro tanto wrongdoing, see KAGAN, supra note 42. 
 57.  See Gardner, Justification and Reasons, supra note 8. It should be noted at Gardner’s view of 
justification is not without its critics. The thesis that being justified requires acting for certain reasons is 
controversial across various branches of philosophy, and even within legal philosophy. While I find 
Gardner’s account illuminating, providing an independent defense of its plausibility is beyond the scope 
of this article. I thank Ruth Chang for pressing me on this point. 
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As such, the cutting is justifiable. 
Still, the issue of justification is not yet fully resolved at this stage of 
the analysis. It remains to be seen whether the person who performs the 
act of cutting (the surgeon) is justified in doing so. It is not enough that 
she acts in the presence of undefeated reasons in favor of cutting—rather, 
she must act for one or more of these reasons. To borrow from the 
distinction discussed above, conformity to her undefeated reasons will not 
suffice; she must comply with those reasons. In the breach-of-promise-to-
lunch example, if the parent acts for the undefeated reason of saving her 
child, then not only is her conduct justifiable (as explained above), but 
moreover, she is justified in missing the lunch. So, too, in the cutting 
example, if the surgeon acts for undefeated reasons (the fact that doing so 
will contribute to saving the patient’s life), then not only is her conduct 
justifiable (as also described above) but the surgeon is justified in cutting. 
If instead persons act for reasons that are either defeated or weigh against 
their conduct, then while their conduct remains justifiable, they 
themselves are not justified. For example, if the parent acts for reasons 
that are defeated (say, that the hospital is near her favorite outlet mall and 
this trip will give her an excuse to do some shopping after the child is 
treated) or reasons that weigh against the breach (say, that she wants to 
hurt her colleague’s feelings by skipping lunch), then while her breach of 
the promise is still justifiable, she is not justified in the breach. So, too, if 
the surgeon acts for reasons that are defeated (to refine her surgical skills 
in hopes of getting a raise) or that weigh against cutting (the fact that 
cutting will feed her sadistic desire to mutilate bodies), then while her 
conduct would still be justifiable, she is not justified in performing it.  
In other words, to bridge the divide between the justifiable and 
justified, our explanatory reasons matter. As Gardner observes:  
An action is justifiable if the reasons in favour of it are not defeated by the 
reasons against; but it is justified only if the agent acts for one or more of 
those undefeated reasons.58 
As explained above, sources stand in need of justification when they 
issue directives that they claim are authoritative. In other words, claiming 
to (robustly) give someone else an obligation to obey your directive is the 
kind of action that calls for justification. Meanwhile, subjects stand in 
need of justification when they treat a source’s directive as if it were 
authoritative. By breaching the obligation to act according to one’s own 
lights, the obedient subject commits a pro tanto wrong.  
In the next Part, we will employ these pieces of the puzzle to identify 
 
 58.  JOHN GARDNER, Crime: In Proportion and in Perspective, in OFFENCES 
AND DEFENCES, supra note 8, at 227. One’s reasons may be mixed: some defeated, some undefeated. The 
key to justification is that undefeated reason(s) feature among the reasons for which one acts. 
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the following: the conditions under which sources may be justified in 
claiming authority, the normative force justified claims of authority may 
have on subjects’ rational horizons, and the conditions under which 
subjects may be justified in treating directives as if they were 
authoritative.  
III. THE SOLUTIONS 
This Part offers solutions to three puzzles regarding authority, 
obligation, and justification. Each Section of this Part begins by 
recounting the puzzles under investigation and then uses the conceptual 
tools examined in Part II to attempt to solve each puzzle. 
A. Solving the Puzzle of Justified Authority 
The puzzle of justified authority asks when, if ever, is a source’s claim 
of authority justified? According to the analysis of justification discussed 
above, this puzzle directs our attention to two distinct but related sets of 
questions.  
First, did the source have undefeated normative reason(s) in favor of 
claiming authority?  
 
Second, in so doing, did the source act for those undefeated reasons?  
If both questions can be answered in the affirmative, then we have 
identified a case of justified authority.59 Below, this Section draws on 
Gardner’s distinction between justifiable and justified claims of authority 
to set up the framework for answering these questions and examines Raz’s 
service conception of authority for answers.60 
1. Justifiable Claims of Authority 
An answer to the first question above, whether the source had 
undefeated normative reason(s) in favor of claiming authority, is 
suggested by the central thesis in Joseph Raz’s famous service conception 
of authority, the Normal Justification Thesis (hereinafter “NJT”). Raz 
 
 59.  That said, it is best not to get too excited about what justified authority entails. See supra 
Section III.B. for a deflationary solution to that puzzle. 
 60.  For a standard gloss of the relationship between satisfaction of NJT and the fate of 
philosophical anarchism, see  BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN 
LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 172 (2007). “The anarchist thesis, in Razian 
terms, is simply the claim that law always fails to satisfy the Normal Justification Thesis.” Id. In this 
article, I offer an alternative version of the anarchist thesis – albeit one that builds on a broadly Razian 
(and Gardnerian) framework. 
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posited: 
[T]he normal way to establish that a person has authority over another 
person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply 
with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative 
directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as 
authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to 
follow the reasons which apply to him directly.61 
Three points are worth noting about Raz’s formulation. First, it is 
somewhat odd that a thesis called the “normal justification thesis” does 
not mention anything about justification. Given Raz’s formulation, it 
would be better entitled, “the normal way to establish that a person has 
authority over another person thesis.” Granted, that’s a mouthful, but at 
least it would not beg the question of what precisely calls for justification. 
Putting this quibble to the side, we will treat the NJT as offering a partial 
solution to a genuine question of justification. 
Second, by formulating the thesis in terms that imply justified claims 
of authority actually succeed in doing what the sources claim they do, 
Raz’s formulation begs the question posed by the puzzle of entailment, 
whether justified authoritative directives entail obligations to obey. We 
will leave this matter for further discussion below. 
Third, a point of terminology: while Raz’s formulation of the NJT in 
the cited passage is phrased in terms of the subject better complying with 
the reasons that apply to her, the thesis is better interpreted as speaking to 
the subject’s better conforming with these reasons.62 On its own terms, 
the NJT envisions a situation in which the subject is not acting for the 
reasons that apply to her (she is not complying with those reasons). 
Instead, the subject is acting out of obedience to the directive: she is 
treating the directive as authoritatively binding and thus acting for that 
(purported) reason. Where the conditions of the NJT are satisfied, the 
subject better conforms to the reasons that apply to her when she obeys 
the directive. As such, it makes more sense to phrase the matter in terms 
of conformity rather than compliance. 
With these points clarified, we can now identify a partial solution to 
the puzzle of justified authority. Recall that the first question posed by 
this puzzle is whether the source had undefeated normative reasons in 
favor of claiming authority. Where the NJT is satisfied, the answer is yes. 
Provided that the subject would better conform with reasons that apply to 
 
 61.  RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 1 at 53; see also, RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra 
note 8 at 214.  
 62.  While it is not clear in this formulation of the NJT whether Raz had in mind the distinction 
between conformity and compliance that I spelled out above. In latter articles, however, he uses the term 
conformity as I intend it. See JOSEPH RAZ, Explaining Normativity: Reason and the Will, in ENGAGING 
REASON, supra note 10.  
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her if she accepts the source’s directive as authoritatively binding and tries 
to follow it, rather than trying to follow the reasons that apply to her 
directly, then normally, the source does have undefeated normative 
reasons in favor of claiming authority. Put simply, if the subject would do 
better by obeying the source’s directive rather than acting according to 
her own lights, then the NJT is satisfied. Where the NJT is satisfied, the 
source’s claim of authority is justifiable. 
When might the NJT be satisfied? The most common instances involve 
cases where the source has greater knowledge than its subjects, is in a 
better position to resolve coordination problems, or the subjects suffer 
from weakness of will. Let us take examples of each in turn. 
First, consider cases involving epistemic guidance, such as my 
dilemma in in driver vs. girl-on-bicycle.63 If someone sees the girl and 
yells a directive to me (“Stop!”), then that claim of authority satisfies the 
NJT on grounds that the person who yelled had greater knowledge than I 
did under the circumstances. As such, it is justifiable for the source to 
issue the directive and claim authority over me in so doing.  
Second, consider cases involving coordination problems. Such a 
problem can be illustrated by considering the main staircase at the London 
School of Economics. Indeed, it is a natural experiment in coordination 
problems: a highly diverse international student body frequently finds it 
impossible to resolve the matter of which side of the stairs ought to be 
used. Americans tend to walk on the right, British on the left, with various 
other students either selecting a side or walking in the middle in hopes of 
avoiding collisions. It is time-consuming and frequently dangerous to 
walk that staircase, never knowing whether someone will come bounding 
around a corner, smacking dead into someone heading the opposite way. 
Let us call this hypothetical staircase mayhem. If some bold soul were to 
post a sign at the base and top of the staircase with a directive such as 
“Walk On The Left,” and people obeyed this claim of authority, the stairs 
would be much safer.64 Such is an example of satisfying the NJT on 
grounds of successful coordination and, given the stipulations here, the 
sign-poster’s claim of authority was justifiable. 
Finally, consider cases involving weakness of will, such as the would-
be runner, who is tempted to snuggle back into her warm blankets on a 
chilly winter morning. Let us call this hypothetical, weak-willed runner. 
If her coach calls to direct her, “Get out of bed and start running,” and in 
 
 63.  See supra Section II.A. 
 64.  The example is drawn from my experience as a student at the London School of Economics. 
Some bold soul did manage to resolve this problem by posting signs, thus coordinating the flow of stair-
traffic. Eventually, however, the signs fell down and the bold soul’s coordination solution did not stick, 
which just goes to show that satisfying the NJT on grounds of coordination requires effective cooperation 
by the subject group. (That is, it requires de facto authority. See supra note 55). 
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so doing, the coach manages to strengthen the weak-willed runner’s 
resolve such that she goes for her morning run, then the coach’s directive 
satisfies the NJT. Again, then, his claim of authority over the runner 
would be justifiable.  
In all of these cases, there are normative reasons that apply to the 
subjects (safety of the girl, safety of the students, fitness of the runner) 
that make it the case that the subjects ought to do what the sources are 
telling them to do. If the subjects would better conform to these reasons 
by treating the sources’ directives as if they were authoritatively binding, 
then the conditions of the NJT are satisfied and the sources’ claims of 
authority are justifiable. 
2. Justified Claims of Authority 
The second question in the puzzle of justified authority asks whether, 
in claiming authority, the source acted for those undefeated reasons. If 
so, the source is justified in issuing the directive. An answer to this second 
question is suggested by another thesis from Raz’s service conception of 
authority: the dependence thesis. According to the dependence thesis: 
[A]ll authoritative directives should be based, among other factors, on 
reasons which apply to the subjects of those directives and which bear on 
the circumstances covered by the directives.65  
What we learn from the dependence thesis is two-fold: (1) those who 
claim authority, and who wish to be fully justified in so doing, must issue 
their claims of authority for the right reasons, and (2) the right reasons for 
claiming authority are the undefeated normative reasons that apply to the 
subjects under the circumstances. Those reasons must feature amongst the 
source’s explanatory reasons when issuing the directive. Otherwise, the 
source’s claim of authority is, at best, justifiable but not justified.66  
We can illustrate how these pieces fit together by considering a small 
village separated from the City Center by a single road. All of the jobs in 
the area are located in the City Center, so it is crucial that people from the 
small village are able to travel the road into the City Center. Many of the 
parents in the village have to drop off their children at school in the 
morning and then rush off to work in order to arrive to the City Center on 
time for work. There is no speed limit set by law, so people drive at 
whatever speed they judge as appropriate to get to and from the City 
Center. Because people are often rushing to work, they often fail to 
 
 65.  Raz, supra note 8 at 214.  
 66.  Of course, if they get the calculation wrong, then the NJT is not satisfied, and thus their claim 
of authority is not even justifiable. It may, however, be excused. See GARDNER, The Gist of 
Excuses, in OFFENCES AND DEFENSES, supra note 25. Here, it is assumed that they got the calculation 
right and issued a directive that satisfies the NJT. 
26
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/2
434 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90 
conform to the safety-reasons to drive more slowly. And because of the 
high traffic congestion and short timeframes available for travel from the 
village to the City Center in the morning, the road is often dangerous to 
travel, with many accidents, injuries, and occasional deaths.  
Upon becoming aware of this situation, two people in the village post 
signs on the road stating, “Speed Limit: 25 MPH.” Travelers on the road 
obey the directives. Accidents, injuries, and deaths are reduced—
although a considerable number of villagers are more frequently late for 
work, resulting in docked pay in several instances. Let us assume that the 
safety-improvement reasons in favor of driving the speed limit defeat the 
late-to-work reasons against driving the speed limit. Let us further assume 
the villagers better conform to their undefeated safety-improvement 
reasons by obeying the speed limit than they would do if they tried to 
conform to those reasons directly—that is, they drive better by obeying 
the directive than by their own lights. 
So far, the hypothetical illustrates two justifiable directives: both of the 
signs posted are directives that claim to be authoritative, and by obeying 
the speed limit, the villagers better conform to their undefeated normative 
reasons in favor of staying safe.  
To evaluate whether either directive is fully justified, we must look to 
the reasons why the two people posted the signs. Assume that sign-poster 
#1 is the village busybody who frequently goes around telling other 
people what to do. She posted the sign, at least in part, for altruistic 
reasons—because she was concerned about the safety of the people 
traveling down the road. Compare her position to that of sign-poster #2, 
an unemployed job-seeker, whose reasons for posting the sign had 
nothing to do with concerns about the safety of people traveling down the 
road. Rather, sign-poster #2 simply wanted to slow-up the pace of travel 
on the road, in hopes of causing villagers to arrive late to work and lose 
their jobs. 
According to the analysis set out here, sign-poster #1’s claim of 
authority is justified, while #2’s claim of authority is not. Consider further 
a situation in which the village council decides to post a speed limit sign—
that is, it makes and publicizes a speed limit law for their subjects, the 
road travelers. According to the hypothetical, this claim of legal authority 
is justifiable. However, consider a distinction between two council 
members. Council member #1 votes in favor of the speed limit on grounds 
that it will promote safety, while council member #2 does so on grounds 
that doing so will slow the pace of travel on the road for people coming 
from the village, most of whom (for purposes of the hypothetical) are 
members of an ethnic or racial group against which council member #2 is 
biased. On the account offered here, the claim to legal authority is 
justifiable in both cases, but only council member #1 is justified in 
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claiming that authority. This solution strikes me as the correct answer to 
this problem—combining the service conception of authority with the 
analytic distinction between justifiable and justified action explains 
why.67 
B. Solving the Puzzle of Entailment 
The puzzle of entailment asks whether justified claims of authority 
entail obligations to obey. As previously noted, I share the philosophical 
anarchist’s intuition that the answer here is “no.” This Section briefly 
reviews the conditions under which the answer may be “yes”, then I will 
consider what rational force justified claims of authority might have for 
sources short of giving them obligations to obey.68 
First, however, note one implication of the framework developed thus 
far: the moral condition of each party—the source and the subject—
requires a distinct analysis. Stephen Perry correctly calls for such a 
distinct analysis in debunking what he calls the “reverse entailment 
problem.”69 A belief in reverse entailment is a belief in the proposition 
that a subject’s obligation to obey a source (say, on grounds that the 
subject has promised to do so) justifies the source’s claim of authority 
over the subject.70 As Perry correctly argues, reverse entailment is false.  
So too, because a source’s claim of authority over a subject is justified 
does not mean that the subject has an obligation to obey the source’s 
directive. Call this the “forward entailment problem.”71 Forward 
entailment, just like reverse entailment, is false, because being justified in 
claiming something does not make that thing true. Sources claim to 
(robustly) give subjects obligations to obey the source’s directives. Under 
the conditions outlined above, sources may sometimes be justified in 
making those claims. Yet, this justification does not entail that the 
subjects actually do have such obligations.  
To see why this is so, consider the example of a child’s miserable 
birthday party: the cake is stale, the balloons are all popped, the bouncy 
house has deflated, and the clown is scary. It is a bad party, and no one is 
having fun. As the children fall apart into tears and begin asking to go 
 
 67.  See supra note 8. 
 68.  For an exploration of somewhat similar themes recognizing the exercise of legitimate 
authority, see Arthur Isak Applbaum, Legitimacy without the Duty to Obey, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. (2010). 
 69.  Perry, Political Authority, supra note 41, at 4. 
 70.  Id. (“[T]he existence of a general obligation to obey the law does not, in and of itself, entail 
legitimate political authority.”). 
 71.  It is not clear to me whether Perry actually endorses forward entailment, but there is some 
reason to suspect he does. He claims, “it is true that legitimate political authority (in the sense of a moral 
power) entails the existence of a general obligation to obey the law.” Id.  If by “legitimate” here, Perry 
means “justified,” then on this point, Perry and I part ways. 
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home, the desperate parents of the birthday boy respond enthusiastically, 
“Hey now… this is a great party! Everyone is having lots of fun!” The 
parents’ claims are untrue and, as such, call for justification. There are 
surely normative reasons in favor of making the untruthful claims (for 
example, the possibility that the power of positive thinking will 
eventually change the reality, to stall for time while they figure out what 
to do to save the party).72 Assume these normative reasons are undefeated 
and the parents act for them—that is, they take those normative reasons 
as their explanatory reasons in making the false statement rather than, for 
example, making the statements in a sarcastic announcement of 
frustration at how lame the party has become.  If all of these conditions 
obtain, then the parents’ false claims are both justifiable and justified. 
Still, just because the parents’ claims are justified does not magically 
change the reality of the situation: the party stinks.  
This conundrum also arises with justified claims of authority. As 
explained below, not even justified claims of authority can actually give 
subjects the kind of reasons that sources claim to give (content-
independent, protected reasons) in the way sources claim to give them 
(robustly). 
1. What Justified Authoritative Directives Cannot Do 
Directives which claim authority, even when they are justified, cannot 
give subjects the kinds of reasons they claim to give, in the way they claim 
to give them—that is, they cannot give sources duties to obey the 
directives. The best attempt in the philosophical literature to defend the 
plausibility that justified claims of authority entail obligations to obey is 
David Enoch’s work, discussed above.73 Framed in Hohfeldian terms, 
Enoch’s account identified the claim made by sources as a claim to have 
a power, which corresponds to the subjects’ liability to be placed under a 
duty upon the source’s say-so.74 As discussed above, according to Enoch, 
 
 72.  So, too, others at the party may very well be justified in believing the parents’ false claim, 
albeit for normative reasons concerning making the party more festive, rather than the truth-value of the 
parents’ claim. Compare, Monti’s discussion of his “Prize for a Belief” hypothetical, in which “an 
eccentric billionaire is willing to give John a prize enabling him to better provide for his children if he just 
believes that p.” As Monti correctly notes, “John has a practical reason to bring it about that he believes 
that p (i.e., that he will win the prize), but that reason does not make believing in p a fitting attitude (only 
truth-related reasons are of the right kind).” Ezequiel Horacio Monti, On Darwall’s Case against the 
Normal Justification Thesis, 128 ETHICS 432, 435 (2018). 
 73.  See, e.g., Enoch, Giving Practical Reasons, supra note 17;  Enoch, Authority and Reason-
Giving, supra note 46.  
 74.  See Hohfeld’s famous analysis of rights offered in two articles, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913); Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710 
(1917).  
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the source claims the power to give subjects duties “robustly,” rather than 
merely triggering the conditions that would make the subject have the 
relevant duty.  
Drawing on an example of a passenger who takes the initiative in an 
emergency and issues orders to her fellow passengers, “everyone stay on 
the left!”, Enoch explains that some people (including him) view the 
passenger as exercising a special moral power to create duties for her 
fellow passengers to obey her directive, in virtue of her say-so, much as 
some people (including him) believe that parents and states have such 
power over children and citizens. Enoch acknowledges that some of us 
resist the idea that the passenger (or the state, or even the parent) has this 
power: 
[T]hose of us who reject this claim seem to reject it because they think that 
the passenger, while clearly being able to create duties (if she shouts 
‘‘everyone stay on the left!’’, and if people are likely to do as she says, and 
if the best way to prevent loss of lives is if everyone stays on the same side, 
then you have a duty to stay on the left), still creates duties by merely 
triggering them, not by robustly giving them.75 
Call this view the triggering-reasons account of authority (as distinct 
from the robust-reason-giving account). While I find that Enoch’s work 
helpfully clarifies the conceptual landscape regarding claims of authority 
and conditions under which those claims may do what they claim, the 
triggering-reasons account seems far more plausible than the robust-
reason-giving account. This is because it is difficult to conceive of sources 
doing much more than trigger duties in the way that the above passage 
illustrates (e.g., through implementing successful coordination 
solutions).76 Again, the implausibility of the robust-reason-giving account 
is grounded in the unlikelihood that there could be a pre-existing, 
independent, general reason for B to treat A's order to φ as a content-
independent, pre-emptive reason for φ-ing.77 For that to be the case, it 
would have to be true that B (generally and diachronically) should not 
reason for herself but should instead obey A. While, as noted above, we 
could imagine such conditions being satisfied in special cases (e.g., severe 
rational impairment), it seems unlikely that rational beings, as a general 
 
 75.  Enoch, Authority and Reason-Giving, supra note 46, at 15. 
 76.  That is, triggering reasons through implementing successful coordination solutions strikes me 
as the most sources can do through justified claims of authority. They can, of course, do other things – 
such as give subjects reasons epistemically, such as the person who yells, “Stop!” as I drive toward the 
unseen girl on the bike, or assist weak-willed subjects, as in the case of the lazy runner. The yeller does 
not trigger any reason I did not otherwise have; she merely informed me of the conclusion to the full 
practical syllogism that already applied to me. Similarly, the coach does not trigger any new reason for 
the runner, he simply makes it possible for the runner to bypass her own weak-will in favor of obeying 
the coach’s directive. 
 77.  See supra note 54. 
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matter, should not think for themselves.78 As a result, I find myself 
amongst the “those of us” to whom Enoch refers, who view successful 
claims of authority as giving reasons merely by triggering them, not by 
giving them robustly. 
Even though sources do not give subjects the kind of reasons they claim 
(or better put, sources do not give subjects the kind of reasons they claim 
to give in the way they claim to give them—that is, robustly), it remains 
true that subjects should nonetheless always do what justified claims of 
authority would have them do. That is, subjects should always conform to 
a source’s justified directive. Indeed, according to the argument set out 
above, subjects should conform to directives that are merely justifiable, 
no matter whether the sources are also justified in issuing those directives. 
For instance, the villagers should drive the speed limit no matter who set 
it or why they did so, because we should always conform to our 
undefeated normative reasons. We should always do what justifiable 
claims of authority would have us do—because, ex hypothesi, if we do 
not, then we are failing to conform to our undefeated normative reasons. 
All of this is true, but only in one sense. We should do what a justifiable 
directive would have us do—but only in the sense that we should take the 
action the directive would have us take. However, we should not, pro 
tanto, do what the justified source would have us do in another sense: we 
should not take the authority’s directive as the kind of reason the source 
claims it to be. That is, pro tanto, we should not treat the source’s directive 
as a content-independent, protected reason, since doing so violates the 
obligation to act according to our own lights. So, in the villagers’ case, 
while it is true ex hypothesi that they should drive at twenty-five miles per 
hour or less down the road, they should do so for reasons discerned for 
themselves, according to their own lights.79 If they decline to be “the 
author of their own decisions” and instead obey the directives, they stand 
in need of justification for so doing. 
To summarize, the obedient subject stands in need of justification in 
virtue of her obedience, even if her obedience is to a justified directive. 
The justification she needs concerns not what she did (since, ex hypothesi, 
she got that part right), but instead, why she did it. Ideally, one will do the 
right thing for the right reasons.80 That is, ideally, one will act for 
undefeated reason(s) that she has discerned herself: she will act according 
 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  For a discussion of the sorts of values that might be realized by the villagers sorting matters 
out for themselves, see Shiffrin’s discussion of the Shared Space movement. Shiffrin, supra note 23, at 
1219-21. 
 80.  Sometimes, however, one does the right thing (conforms to what a justifiable directive would 
have one do) for the wrong reasons (out of obedience). Such is the position of one who obeys justified 
authoritative directives. These cases will be considered infra, Section III.C. 
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to her own lights, and she will act according to her own lights.81 Even 
justified directives cannot make it otherwise. 
2. What Justified Authoritative Directives Can Do 
While justified claims of authority might not give sources obligations 
to obey, they can get sources off the moral hook for issuing directives that 
claim authority. Also, such a directive can, in at least some cases, provide 
a service to subjects engaged in practical reasoning, placing them in a 
better moral position than they would be without the justified directive. 
This Section considers the former, while Section C below considers the 
latter. 
In one of the best-entitled legal philosophy articles regarding authority, 
Kenneth Himma boldly declares, Just ‘Cause You’re Smarter Than Me 
Doesn’t Give You a Right to Tell Me What to Do.82 If the analysis set out 
so far is correct, the proper response to Himma is something along the 
lines of, “If you mean ‘right’ in the sense of a Hohfeldian power 
corresponding to a subject’s liability to be placed under duties to obey 
according to a source’s say-so (that is, to be subject to robustly-given, 
content-independent, protected reasons issued by the source), then yes, 
you’re correct... I can’t do that…no one can do that.” This answer is 
consistent with the philosophical anarchist’s view that sources can never 
create the kind of reasons they claim to create, in the way they claim to 
create them. 
A more interesting response to Himma, however, might be something 
along the lines of, “If you mean ‘right’ in the sense of a Hohfeldian 
permission to claim authority over you, then you are incorrect. Provided 
that what I told you to do satisfied the conditions of the NJT, and I told 
you to do it based on explanatory reasons that track the dependence thesis, 
then I am fully justified in telling you what to do and, thus, I am permitted 
to do so.”83 This answer tells us what the justification of authority can do 
for the source: it can get the source off the moral hook for bossing people 
(subjects) around and trying to get them to breach their obligation to act 
according to their own lights. That is, it can transform what would 
 
 81.  “[I]t is a basic principle of practical rationality that one should always act for some undefeated 
reason, i.e. that at least one of the [normative] reasons in favour of doing as one did should have been 
one’s (explanatory) reason for doing it.” GARDNER, Justification and Reasons, supra note 8, at 100. Where 
the subject fails to secure full justification, she may still have an excuse for breaching the obligation to 
act according to one’s own lights. See GARDNER, The Gist of Excuses, in OFFENCES AND DEFENSES, supra 
note 25. 
 82.  Kenneth Einar Himma, Just ‘Cause You’re Smarter Than Me Doesn’t Give You a Right to 
Tell Me What to Do: Legitimate Authority and the Normal Justification Thesis, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 121 (2007). 
 83.  See supra Section III.A.1 for discussion of Raz’s NJT and dependence thesis.  
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otherwise be morally wrongful behavior into morally permissible 
behavior. By issuing directives that conform to the NJT for reasons that 
track the dependence thesis, the source is thereby transformed from a 
morally unjustified buttinsky into a morally justified provider of a rational 
service. Indeed, the idea of an authority offering a service to its subjects—
to assist or enable them in better conforming to what their practical 
reasons would have them do—explains why Raz’s theory is called the 
“service conception of authority.”84   
What, however, can the source’s justification do to improve the moral 
position of the subject? To begin answering this question, recall that the 
obedient subject stands in need of justification in virtue of her obedience, 
even if her obedience is to a justified directive. To review, if one is 
justified in committing a pro tanto wrong (here, obedience to authority), 
then that means she is justified all-things considered and her conduct 
(obedience) is therefore permissible. Securing justification is a two-step 
process: one’s conduct must be justifiable (that is, one’s normative 
reasons in favor of obeying must defeat the reasons against doing so), and 
one must act for one (or more) undefeated normative reasons (that is, one 
or more undefeated normative reasons must feature amongst one’s 
explanatory reasons).  
In seeking the first step of justification, the obedient subject can 
identify that the directive she obeyed was itself justified (or even merely 
justifiable). This is to say the directive satisfied the NJT: the subject was 
likely better to comply with the reasons that applied to her if she accepted 
the directives as authoritatively binding and tried to follow them, rather 
than try to figure out what to do on her own. In other words, the subject 
needed the service offered by the authoritative directive to fulfill the first 
of the two challenges of practical reasoning: to conform to her undefeated 
normative reasons. Ex hypothesi, had she tried to follow her own lights, 
she would have gotten things wrong. She would have hit the girl on the 
bike, crashed into someone walking on the stairs, and blown off her 
morning run.85 Instead, by using the service provided by the directives, 
she managed to conform to the normative reasons that applied to her with 
respect to her actions. As such, her obedience to the directive is justifiable.  
Still, as discussed above, to be permissible, the subject’s obedience 
must not merely be justifiable—it must be justified. In the next Section, 
we consider the conditions under which a subject’s obedience to authority 
can be justified and also whether a subject can ever be duty-bound to obey 
claims of authority. 
 
 84.  Raz, Service Conception, supra note 8. 
 85.  Id.  
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C. Solving the Puzzle of Obedience  
The puzzle of justified obedience raises a two-part question: when, if 
ever, are subjects justified, or perhaps even duty-bound, in obeying 
claims of authority? This Section takes each issue in turn, identifying the 
conditions under which a source’s obedience to authority is justified all-
things-considered (and thus permissible) and the circumstances under 
which a subject may come to have a duty to obey.  
1. When is Obedience Justified? 
To review, according to the modest philosophical anarchism defended 
above, we have an obligation to act according to our own lights. As such, 
if a subject obeys a source’s claim of authority, such obedience calls for 
justification. More specifically, there is an obligation not to obey the law. 
This formulation, however, is subject to misunderstanding. The point is 
not that there is an obligation to disobey the law but merely an obligation 
not to obey the law.86 
If a subject is justified in obeying the law, then her obedience is 
permissible. Securing justification is a two-step process: one’s conduct 
must be justifiable (that is, one’s normative reasons in favor of doing what 
one did must defeat the reasons against doing so), and one must act for 
one (or more) undefeated normative reasons (that is, one of more 
undefeated normative reasons must feature amongst one’s explanatory 
reasons). 
  In circumstances where the subject will better conform to her 
undefeated normative reasons by treating a directive as authoritative, 
rather than trying to sort out what to do for herself, her obedience is 
justifiable. That is, by obeying the directive, she manages to conform to 
the normative reasons that already applied to her regarding that action. In 
those cases, the authoritative directive offers her a normative service: it 
helps her to better conform to what her normative reasons would have her 
do. This normative service, resulting whenever the authoritative directive 
satisfies the NJT, enables subjects to better conform to the demands of 
practical reason. As noted above, it is also the reason why Raz’s theory is 
called the “service conception of authority.”87  
While the subject’s obedience is justifiable whenever the NJT is 
satisfied, we must also address whether the subject’s obedience was 
justified. For, the subject’s breach of the obligation to act according to her 
own lights is only permissible if it is justified, rather than merely 
 
 86.  An obligation to disobey the law implies an obligation not to conform to law’s directives. See 
supra, Section II.C. on the distinction between conformity, compliance, and obedience. 
 87.  Raz, Service Conception, supra note 8. 
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justifiable.  
To determine whether the subject’s obedience is justified, we must turn 
our attention to the subject’s explanatory reasons for obeying the source’s 
directive. Why, we must ask, did she treat the source’s directive as a 
reason to do what it directed, to exclude reasons to do otherwise, and 
regard the directive as such a reason just because the source said so? In 
other words, why did she treat the directive as if it gave her a protected, 
content-independent reason to do what it told her to do? 
Consider two sets of cases. The first is populated with subjects who 
adopt what can be called a “slavishly obedient mentality” when 
confronted with claims of authority. Too lazy to bother trying to sort out 
their normative reasons for themselves, too fearful of the possibility of 
getting it wrong and having to own their mistakes, or too lacking in self-
respect to believe that they have a right (indeed, on this account, an 
obligation) to be the author of their own lives, these subjects treat the 
sources’ claims of authority over them as content-independent, protected-
reasons, and they do so for no good reason. Their explanatory reasons for 
obeying the directive have nothing to do with the considerations that make 
the directive worth obeying: they have nothing to do with the service that 
is being provided by the justified claim of authority. 
The second set of cases involves subjects who adopt what we might 
call a “service-conception mentality” when confronted with claims of 
authority. While these subjects do breach the obligation to act according 
to their own lights (because ex hypothesi, they are obedient subjects), they 
commit a pro tanto wrong in breaching this obligation—these folks do so 
for the right reasons. They obey the directive because they (correctly) 
believe that if they treat the source’s directive as genuinely authoritative 
(if they obey it), they will better conform to the normative reasons that 
apply to them. They recognize their own lack of knowledge, weakness of 
will, etc., and they correctly believe that obeying the source will help them 
better conform to what their normative reasons would have them do. 
Based on the analysis in this Article so far, we can reach the following 
conclusions about two different groups of obedient subjects. The first 
group, those subjects who obey out of a “slavishly-obedient” mentality, 
fail to bridge the gap between justifiability and full justification. As such, 
their pro tanto wrong of obedience is not saved from the fate of being 
wrong all-things-considered. Although they did the right thing (they 
avoided hitting the girl on the bike, did not smack into anyone on the 
stairs, and completed their morning run), they did so for the wrong 
reasons. That is, they did so because, when confronted with a source’s 
claim of authority over them, they responded with a slavishly obedient 
mentality. The second group, subjects who adopt a “service-conception” 
mentality toward claims if authority, do bridge the gap between justifiable 
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obedience and justified obedience. They obey for the right reasons: 
because they (correctly) believe that doing so will help them better 
conform to the normative reasons that apply to them under the 
circumstances. In claiming the source’s justified directive as their 
explanatory reason for action, they not only manage to do the right thing 
but also do so for the right reasons. As such, their obedience is morally 
permissible all-things-considered. 
2. When is Obedience Obligatory? 
Thus far, this Article has focused primarily on the obligation to act 
according to one’s own lights, and how that pro tanto obligation impacts 
the moral position of both sources claiming authority and subjects 
obeying such claims. The conclusions reached so far are two-fold. First, 
sources may be justified in claiming authority when two conditions are 
jointly satisfied: the directives conform to the NJT and the reasons why 
the source issues such directives (the source’s explanatory reasons) track 
the dependence thesis.88 Second, subjects may be justified in obeying 
directives where two conditions are jointly satisfied: the directives 
conform to the NJT and the reasons why the subject obeys such directives 
(the subject’s explanatory reasons) track a “service conception 
mentality,” rather than a “slavishly-obedient mentality.”  
So much then for the justification for obeying authority. At this point, 
another question presents itself: when might a subject have more than just 
a justification for obeying a directive and also have an obligation to obey 
the directive? Before launching into this inquiry, consider a point about 
conflicting duties. If it is possible for a subject to have both an obligation 
to act according to one’s own lights and an obligation to obey a source’s 
claim of authority, then our duties can conflict. This is because if there is 
ever a duty to obey a directive, this duty would necessarily conflict with 
the duty to act according to one’s own lights.  
As we have already seen, duties can indeed conflict. Consider the case 
of the parent who breached a promise to meet a colleague for lunch 
because she took her injured child to the hospital.89 In virtue of her 
promise to meet her colleague, she had a duty to attend the lunch. In virtue 
of her role as parent, she had a duty to take her child to the hospital. She 
faced conflicting duties because it was impossible for her to do both. No 
matter what she did, she would breach one of her duties.  
As this case illustrates, conflicting duties are not only possible but a 
common feature of our moral lives.90 When our duties conflict, we need 
 
 88.  See supra Section III.A.2. 
 89.  See supra Section II.E. 
 90.  See generally, Terrance McConnell, Moral Dilemmas, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
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not despair. It is possible to conform to one duty, while being fully 
justified, all-things-considered, in breaching the other. In such cases, we 
do nothing morally impermissible. Such was the case with the parent who 
breached her obligation to meet her colleague for lunch. In fulfilling her 
duty to aid her child, she breached her obligation to meet her colleague, 
but her breach was (ex hypothesi) fully justified. Her normative reasons 
to help her child in a medical emergency defeated her reasons to meet her 
colleague for lunch. As such, breaching her duty to meet her colleague 
was justifiable all-things-considered. Moreover, the reason why she failed 
to meet her colleague (her explanatory reasons) tracked her normative 
reasons. She breached her duty to her colleague because of the 
(normative) reasons she had to help her child. As such, she was fully 
justified in breaching her duty to her colleague and thus, her breach was 
not wrong all-things-considered. In other words, her failure to meet her 
colleague was morally permissible.   
Applying this framework, we can now identify the circumstances under 
which obedience to a claim of authority is obligatory. Recall the 
hypothetical driver who stands in need of the service offered by a 
justifiable claim of authority (regarding speed limits) to avoid hitting the 
girl on a bike.91 In this case, the subject confronts a conflict of duties. The 
driver has both a duty not to hit the girl on the bike and to act according 
to her own lights (thus, not to obey the source’s claim of authority). If the 
speed limit directive conforms to the NJT, that means the driver needed 
the service offered by that directive to avoid hitting the girl. In such 
circumstances, it is not only justifiable to obey the directive, but the driver 
has an obligation to do so. The nature of the obligation to obey is thus 
best understood as a duty to use the rational service that is on offer when 
one is confronted with a justifiable authoritative directive.92 Ex hypothesi, 
if the driver failed to make use of the service offered to her, she would 
have breached her duty not to hit the girl on the bike. By treating the speed 
limit directive as authoritative, the driver managed to conform to her duty 
 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed., 2018) (surveying various accounts and explanations of conflicting 
moral duties). 
 91.  See supra text accompanying notes 12-13. 
 92.  This account of the obligation to obey is not in competition with accounts that ground their 
explanation in terms of voluntary commitments (e.g., consent-based account, social-contract accounts), 
gratitude or fairness-based accounts, or the necessity of obey just institutions. As it happens, I doubt any 
of these accounts provide a plausible grounding for a general obligation to obey, but one might embrace 
one or more of these accounts and still acknowledge the normative grounding of the obligation to obey 
set out here. Moreover, my account does not deny that one or more of these accounts can explain 
piecemeal obligations to obey – such as when one comes to have an obligation to obey the law in virtue 
of having promised to do so (e.g., by taking a citizenship oath, or swearing an oath upon assuming legal 
office). For a survey of these alternative grounds of an obligation to obey, see Leslie Green, Law and 
Obligations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW  525-539 (Jules 
Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds. 2002).  
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not to hit the girl. Moreover, if the driver obeyed out of a service-
conception mentality, then she is also fully justified in breaching her 
obligation to act according to her own lights. In that case, she will have 
done nothing morally impermissible, all-things-considered.  
The obligation to obey, thus understood, is an obligation that arises 
from a service conception of authority. Importantly, however, this 
account denies that claims of authority actually give us the kinds of 
reasons they claim to (protected, content-independent reasons) in the way 
they claim to do so (robustly). Even when a source is fully justified in 
issuing a directive that it claims to be authoritatively binding, the source’s 
say-so does not ground a resulting obligation to obey. Rather, the 
obligation to obey, where it exists, is “piecemeal.” That is, it exists in 
some cases with respect to some subjects under some circumstances, but 
it does not exist generally with respect to all subjects on all occasions. 
Moreover, where the obligation to obey does exist, its grounding is not 
best explained in terms of whether the source’s claim of authority is 
justified. As we have seen, claims of authority can be fully justified, 
without entailing any obligation to obey on the part of subjects. Instead, 
the obligation to obey is grounded in the subject needing the service the 
directive offers. If the subject does not treat the directive as if it created 
an obligation to obey, the subject will fail to conform to her other duty 
(e.g., the duty not to hit the girl on the bike).  
Putting these considerations together, then, we can reach the following 
conclusions. Ideally, subjects will do the right thing for the right reasons, 
which the subjects have discerned for themselves. That is, they will 
conform to the normative reasons that apply to them—such as not hitting 
girls on bikes—for explanatory reasons that track their normative reasons. 
In such circumstances, one manages to live according to one’s own lights 
in both senses: according to one’s own lights and according to one’s own 
lights.93 Yet, of course, things are rarely ideal. We are often ignorant of 
the normative reasons that apply to us (such as when we do not know that 
we are heading into a collision course with the girl on the bike).94 Or we 
require someone else to create a coordination solution that will both 
trigger new normative reasons and enable us to conform to our normative 
reasons (such as when someone posts signs on a staircase where people 
are otherwise running into each other). Or we require someone to help us 
overcome our weakness of will, which will otherwise result in our failure 
to conform to our normative reasons (such as when a coach directs his 
athlete to go for her morning run). In each of these cases, if we are 
confronted with a justifiable claim of authority (one that conforms to the 
 
 93.  See supra Section II B. 
 94.  See supra Section II.A. 
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NJT), then not only would it be justifiable for us to obey those directives, 
we would have an obligation to do so. Again, the obligation to obey is 
best understood as grounded in a duty to make use of the rational service 
offered to us when we are confronted with a justifiable authoritative 
directive. Moreover, if we obey the directive out a service-conception 
mentality, then we are fully justified in breaching our pro tanto duty to 
act according to our own lights. In such cases, there is no moral wrong, 
all-things-considered: both our actions and our obedience are morally 
permissible. 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS 
The anarchist thesis, in Dempsey’s terms, is the three-part claim that:  
(1) The law might very well satisfy the NJT in some particular 
circumstances;  
(2)  In those cases, the law is justified in claiming authority over the subject 
for whom the NJT is satisfied; 
(3)  Still, even in those cases, the law does not actually manage to give the 
subject the kind of reason it claims to give (a duty), in the way it claims to 
give it (robustly). 
This three-part claim is perfectly consistent with the view that law creates 
first-order reasons for its subjects and can even trigger duties in some 
(perhaps many) cases. It simply never does so robustly. Moreover, a law 
that satisfies the NJT can provide its subjects with the grounds needed to 
justify their obedience to law. While an obedient subject breaches the duty 
to act according to one’s own lights, that breach is justifiable because the 
law at issue satisfies the NJT.  
One significant implication that follows from the framework set out in 
this Article concerns the attitude we should adopt toward the law. That is, 
claims of authority (including law’s claims of authority), should be 
viewed with a heavy dose of skepticism.95 Even when fully justified, such 
claims do not create obligations to obey simply because of the source’s 
say-so. As such, the law never does what it claims to do, in the way it 
claims to do it.96 Still, according to the framework set out in this Article, 
there is (at least sometimes) significant value to law’s subjects justifiably 
treating the law as if it created obligations to obey the law.97  
Adopting an attitude of skeptical vigilance toward the law implies three 
 
 95.  In previous work, I have labelled the appropriate practical attitude to law’s claim of authority 
as an attitude of “skeptical vigilance.” Michelle Madden Dempsey, On Finnis’s Way In, 57 VILLANOVA 
L. REV. 827 (2012).  
 96.  That is, it does not robustly give us protected, content-independent reasons. See supra text 
accompanying notes 46-49. 
 97.  See supra Section III.C.2. 
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more practical implications regarding how we should conduct ourselves 
with respect to the law. First, we should eschew fashionable rhetoric 
attacking “lawlessness,” as if an absence of “lawfulness” is, in and of 
itself, worthy of condemnation. Second, we should conform to, comply 
with, and sometimes even obey laws that enable us to (re)establish the 
trust necessary to maintain a political community. Third, we should both 
recognize and fulfill those obligations to the law that go beyond mere 
obedience: obligations to both know and improve the law. 
A. Resisting “Lawlessness” 
The framework developed in this article underscores and illuminates a 
fundamental tension in the law: it is both morally fallible and morally 
valuable. This Section considers the implications that follow from law’s 
moral fallibility, reserving reflections on its moral value to the next 
Section.  
Law is morally fallible in at least two senses. First, it sometimes directs 
us to do the wrong thing, such as when it claims authority to require us to 
fight in unjust wars.98 Second, it sometimes directs us not to do the right 
thing, such as when it claims authority to prohibit us from leaving water 
in the desert for vulnerable asylum seekers.99 Given law’s moral 
fallibility, we should avoid making arguments grounded in a critique of 
“lawlessness” as such. That is, we should not criticize a lack of 
conformity to, compliance with, or obedience to law in and of itself, as if 
an absence of “lawfulness” were in and of itself, worthy of 
condemnation.100  
Arguments grounded in claims regarding the supposed evil of 
“lawlessness” have exploded in recent political discourse.101 These 
 
 98.  MICHAEL WALTZER, JUST & UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL 
ILLUSTRATIONS (5th ed., 2015). 
 99.  Jason A. Cade, "Water Is Life!" (and Speech!): Death, Dissent, and Democracy in the 
Borderlands, 96 IND. L. J. 261, 264 (2020) (discussing criminal prosecutions of humanitarian protesters 
for providing life-saving water to asylum seekers crossing the Sonoran Desert). These two ways are hardly 
a comprehensive survey of the law’s moral fallibility, but they are suitable here for framing our discussion. 
The law’s moral fallibility arguably extends to situations where it claims authority over matters that are 
simply “none of the law’s business,” and where it fails to offer a justifiable claim of authority that would 
prevent atrocities. On the former kind of moral fallibility, see H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND 
MORALITY (1963) (discussing The Wolfenden Report’s famous quote regarding the scope of “the law’s 
business.”) JOHN FREDERICK WOLFENDEN & KARL A MENNINGER, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION (1963).  On the latter kind of moral fallibility, see Jeremy 
Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 Columbia L. Rev. 1681 
(2005). 
 100.  “Although it is not a particularly inspiring or romantic description, the law is, in the end, an 
instrument. And like all instruments, it can be used for good or bad purposes.” SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 
399 (2011). 
 101.  A search of Lexis major newspapers database turns up 29 and 25 hits for the search term, 
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critiques are being offered by all sides of our fractured political 
community. Take two recent examples. From conservative commentator, 
Buck Sexton, writing in the most widely circulated newspaper in the 
United States (USA Today), invoking a critique of “lawlessness” in both 
the title and twice a single paragraph, as if in fear that some inattentive 
reader might miss his point:  
Someone needs to step in and crack down on the lawlessness. Either it will 
be local and state police — or military forces. If the unrest continues, there 
will be no third option left. For days, rioters have been on a spree of looting, 
arson and attacks on law enforcement and innocent bystanders. They are 
emboldened, and increasingly lawless.102 
Concerns regarding the threat of “lawlessness” are on display in the 
following, as well, from the libertarian think-tank, Bluegrass Institute:  
Advancing liberty-minded policy solutions in a lawless society ruled by 
thugs would, in fact, be meaningless – an exercise in futility. Freedom and 
liberty cannot exist without law and order.103 
And lest we think this rhetoric is only a tool used by the right-wing, 
consider the critique of “lawlessness” in President Joseph R. Biden's 
Inaugural Address: 
Today, on this January day, my whole soul is in this: Bringing America 
together. Uniting our people. And uniting our nation. I ask every American 
to join me in this cause. Uniting to fight the common foes we face: Anger, 
resentment, hatred. Extremism, lawlessness, violence. Disease, 
joblessness, hopelessness.104  
One unifying tendency in these critical invocations of “lawlessness” is 
that no one ever bothers to really explain what they mean, except by 
limited ostension to “bad stuff we should fear and reject.” In one sense, 
then, the increasingly popular critique of “lawlessness” as such is 
effectively sound and fury signifying nothing.105  
However, a more worrying tendency is that the opposite of 
“lawlessness”—that is, “lawfulness”—is being held up as a good. This 
tendency is worrying because the mere fact that a norm is legally valid 
simply “does not provide any guidance at all on what anyone should do 
 
“lawlessness,” for the months of January 2015 and January 2019, respectively – as compared to 161 hits 
for the period of January 2021.   
 102.  Buck Sexton, American carnage: These Aren't Protests - They're Riots. Someone Must End 
the Lawlessness, USA TODAY, (updated June 8, 2020, 2:33 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/06/02/george-floyd-riots-looting-anarchy-antifa-trump-
military-column/3123008001/ (emphasis added). 
 103.  Jim Waters, Liberty and Lawlessness Can't Co-Exist, THE RECORD, January 21, 2021 
(emphasis added). 
 104.  Joseph R. Biden, Presidential Inaugural Address (January 20, 2021). 
 105.  My thanks to Evan Butts for the framing of these points. 
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about anything on any occasion.”106 Rather, as Gardner has correctly 
observed, it is perfectly consistent to hold that a law is valid but 
nonetheless “entirely worthless and should be universally attacked, 
shunned, ignored, or derided.”107  Particularly in light of law’s long track 
record of moral fallibility, and the need for any claim of authority to itself 
be justified, we should eschew currently fashionable arguments grounded 
in simple critiques of “lawlessness.”  
B. (Re)Establishing Trust 
Despite law’s moral fallibility, law is also, at least sometimes, morally 
valuable. As we have seen in the hypotheticals of driver vs. girl-on-bike, 
staircase mayhem, and weak-willed-runner, claims of authority, whether 
legal or not, can provide a valuable service.108 They can help us do the 
right thing—to conform to what our normative reasons would have us 
do—even when we are ignorant of the normative reasons that apply to us, 
when we require implementation and enforcement of coordination 
solutions, and when we lack the strength of will to do what those 
normative reasons would have us do.  
In the same way, the law can provide a valuable service to its subjects. 
When it comes to drivers and a wide range of other activities, such as the 
safest way to store dangerous chemicals, the law can provide a service to 
those who would otherwise fail to be aware of, and thus fail to conform 
to, what their normative reasons would have them do. When it comes to 
coordination solutions, whether simple ones, such as establishing and 
enforcing what side of the road to drive on, or complex ones, such as 
managing scarce resources, reducing pollution, or distributing life-saving 
vaccines, the law can provide a valuable service insofar as we would 
otherwise fail to achieve the level, degree, and consistency of 
coordination required to conform to our normative reasons. Finally, when 
it comes to weakness of will, such as a reluctance to pay our fair share of 
taxes or acquiescence to the temptation to shoplift, the law can strengthen 
our resolve and thereby enable us to conform to what our normative 
reasons would have us do. 
Another valuable service the law can provide is to establish the 
conditions under which people can come to trust one another enough to 
establish and maintain a political community. As Scott Shapiro correctly 
observes: 
[T]he problems of the circumstances of legality are largely (although not 
 
 106.  John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, 46 AM J. JURIS. 199, 202 (2001). 
 107.  Id. at 210. 
 108.  Supra text accompanying notes 57-58. 
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exclusively) problems of trust: either members of the community cannot 
be trusted to do what they ought to do, can be trusted but need help realizing 
their potential, or do not trust each other enough to engage in the social 
cooperation necessary to solve the serious and numerous problems that can 
arise.109 
Given the centrality of trust to maintaining a political community, it is 
important to recognize the valuable role law can play in establishing and 
maintaining trust amongst law’s subjects. Indeed, “one of the main roles 
the law plays is to manage trust and distrust,” and while we cannot and 
should not assume that law is always going to get things right, we should 
be willing, where necessary, to make use of the rational service the law 
can provide to us when it offers a directive that conforms to the NJT. In 
this way, we can effectively use the service of law’s claim of authority 
not only to “compensate for…lack of trust in others” but also enable 
members of our political community “to capitalize on … trust where it 
exists.”110 Particularly in light of the political polarization and resulting 
crisis of trust we are experiencing at present, the value of law and its claim 
to authority in (re)establishing trust is crucial for maintaining our political 
community. 
C. Obligations Beyond Obedience 
Much ink has been spilled over the centuries regarding the supposed 
obligation to obey the law. One point of this Article has been to contribute 
something new to these debates, by drawing together Joseph Raz’s service 
conception of authority with John Gardner’s account of justification to 
illuminate new answers to old questions. Yet, it is important to note that 
the obligation to obey the law, where it exists, is hardly the only obligation 
we have regarding the law. Two other obligations often go overlooked: 
the obligation to know the law and the obligation to improve the law.111 
The obligation to know the law does not entail subjects having an 
obligation to develop an encyclopedic knowledge of every legal norm in 
their legal system. That would be impossible, both in terms of human 
capacity and the nature of the law itself.112 Rather, the obligation to know 
 
 109.  SHAPIRO, supra note 100, at 337. See also id. at 170, defining “circumstances of legality” in 
terms of a community having “numerous and serious moral problems whose solutions are complex, 
contentious, or arbitrary.”).  
 110.  SHAPIRO, supra note 100, at 334. 
 111.  This discussion is inspired by Green, supra note 92 at 545-547. Green also examines and 
endorses what he calls an “obligation to facilitate the rule of law.” For reasons of space, I decline to follow 
that part of Green’s discussion. 
 112.  The point regarding the nature of law is grounded in the fact that the fundamental norm of any 
legal system – what Hart called its rule of recognition – is in a constant state of being constituted and 
reconstituted, through more or less accidental means.  
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the law is two-fold. First, it entails an obligation to know of the existence 
of starkly unjust laws that cause suffering and/or endanger the well-being 
of others in one’s community and elsewhere in the world.113 Second, it 
entails an obligation to have a “basic acquaintance with the most 
significant legal institutions and traditions” of one’s own legal 
system(s).114 
This formulation of the obligation to know the law implicitly rejects 
Leslie Green’s claim that “it is permissible to take little interest in the law, 
and to tend to one’s own garden.”115 Sure, it might be permissible to take 
little interest in the law as a general matter, all-things-considered, but, pro 
tanto, it is not permissible to take little interest when it comes to specific, 
unjust laws that cause suffering or endanger others’ well-being. If it is 
ever permissible to take little interest in such immoral laws, it would only 
be because one is justified all-things-considered in failing to conform to 
one’s obligation to know the law.116 
The obligation to improve the law is also two-fold. In one sense, it 
entails the rather straightforward obligation that applies primarily to law-
making and interpreting legal officials: to improve the law by reforming 
laws that are morally pernicious.117 While there are surely competing 
 
The ultimate rule of recognition is, to a very large extent, accidentally made. Each official takes 
himself or herself to be merely following the practice of his or her peers, when in fact he or she is 
helping to constitute that practice and thereby to shape the rule. The rule changes precisely as it 
was born, mainly by mistake -- that is to say, by successive attempts merely to follow it that in 
fact contribute to its development. 
John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, Review of Scott Shapiro’s LEGALITY, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REV. 
(December 8, 2011) (comparing Hart, supra note 44, to Shapiro, supra note 100). 
 113.  The phrase, “cause suffering and/or endanger the well-being of others,” is intended to include 
suffering and endangerment to both individual human beings, animals, the environment. It may also 
extend to a duty to know of laws that harm or threaten aesthetic and cultural harms. 
 114.  Green, supra note 92 at 545.  
 115.  Id. at 546, 
 116.  The pieces of the puzzle set out supra, in Section II, provide the conceptual tools to run the 
argument regarding whether any particular failure to fulfil one’s duty to know the law is justified. First, 
we must ask whether one has undefeated normative reason(s) not to do what this obligation would have 
one do. Second, we must ask whether, in failing to conform to this duty, one acted for one or more 
undefeated normative reason (that is, whether one’s explanatory reason(s) tracked one of more undefeated 
normative reason). In such cases, say, where one is completely consumed with caring for an ailing parent, 
injured child, or dealing with one’s own physical or mental burdens, one could be justified in “tending to 
one’s own garden,” and thus, one’s failure to know the law would be morally permissible, all-things-
considered.  
 117.  Green is right to note that this obligation (which he calls the “obligation to develop law”) 
applies “most urgently to legislative and adjudicative officials.” Id. at 546. It is sometimes (wrongly) 
supposed that courts do not have ability to improve law, but only to apply it. Yet, as Green correctly 
observes, this is an oversimplification: 
Courts have the power not only to apply the law but to change it. They may do so intentionally, 
through the exercise of their equitable jurisdiction, their powers to overrule or distinguish cases, 
and by applying the doctrine of desuetude. They may also do so unintentionally through the 
gradual crystallization of new legal rules. Id. 
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reasons that weigh in favor of maintaining stability in legal institutions 
and protecting expectations grounded in such stability, the obligation to 
improve the law makes it the case that, pro tanto, a failure to reform 
morally pernicious laws calls for justification.118  
In another sense, the obligation to improve the law applies primarily to 
law’s subjects and manifests itself in a duty to engage in the political 
process to improve the law. It entails a duty to write to one’s 
representatives to complain about morally pernicious laws, vote for legal 
officials who will improve the law or refuse to enforce such laws, and 
generally do one’s part in making the law morally better.119 Where these 
efforts are insufficient, the duty to improve the law entails further 
obligations of political protest, conscientious objection, and civil 
disobedience.120  
Any supposed duty one may sometimes have to obey the law is 
dependent upon both the duty to know the law and to improve the law. 
Thus, even if we lack a general obligation to obey the law, as argued 
above, we nonetheless have weighty and important obligations with 
respect to the law. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has defended a modest version of philosophical anarchism, 
according to which the following is true. First, there is a general 
obligation not to obey claims of authority over us, including law’s claims. 
Second, and parasitic upon the first point, there is a general obligation not 
to claim authority over others. Third, and happily for those who claim 
authority and those who obey such claims, breaches of these obligations 
are justifiable. Moreover, where one justifiably claims authority based on 
reasons that apply to the subjects of those claims, the claim of authority 
is justified. So, too, where one justifiably obeys a claim of authority out 
of a “service conception mentality,” one’s obedience is justified. Where 
claims of authority and obedience to such claims are fully justified, they 
are morally permissible. Finally, it is possible for moral duties to conflict, 
such that one may be obligated both not to obey and to obey law’s claim 
 
 118.   STEPHEN SHEPPARD, I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL 
OFFICIALS (2009).  
 119.  Recent examples of legal officials refusing to enforce morally pernicious laws include so-
called “progressive prosecutors” refusing to enforce low level drug offenses. On progressive prosecution 
generally, see Symposium on Progressive Prosecution: Legal, Empirical, and Theoretical Perspectives, 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUSTICE (Fall 2020).  
 120.  Candice Delmas, Political Resistance: A Matter of Fairness, 33 L. & PHIL. 465 (2014); See 
also, KIMBERLEY BROWNLEE, CONSCIENCE AND CONVICTION: THE CAUSE FOR CIVIL 
DISOBEDIENCE (2012). As with the duty to know the law, the duty to improve law is pro tanto, such that 
a breach of this duty can be justified, all-things-considered. See Green, supra note 92, at 546. 
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of authority. By drawing on the work of Joseph Raz and John Gardner to 
construct a framework to defend this version of modest philosophical 
anarchism, this Article has illuminated new answers to intriguing puzzles 
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